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SOURCES AND FORMS OF LAW
III
THE IMPERATIVE ELEMENT
L EGISLATIVE LAWMAKING. Here we have to do with the
part of the legal system which is in the form of rules or
standards authoritatively promulgated by the lawmaking
organ of a politically organized society in advance of decision
and ordinarily in advance of action. This part, which con-
sists of commands or prohibitions or, as many put it today,
of threats, addressed authoritatively to individuals, or of
rules or norms (patterns) of or guides to decision, addressed
authoritatively to tribunals, I call the imperative element.
In the civil-law system legislation also provides principles,
authoritative starting points for reasoning, and defines legal
conceptions. In the common-law system, legislation seems
to provide principles only to the extent that there may be
genuine interpretation by the reason of a statute. Concep-
tions are to be found defined in codifying statutes. But
usually they define common-law conceptions.
Recalling Maine's well known generalization that the
agencies of growth of law are fictions, equity, and legisla-
tion, it may be said that the order of their appearance is in
a large view (1) special fictions, (2) sweeping changes
(sometimes as in equity in Roman law using special pro-
cedural fictions) under the cover of a general fiction, and
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(3) avowed, deliberate lawmaking. In the first there is
a belief or pretence that law is not made or altered. In the
second there is a belief or pretence of interpretation or that
law of higher authority is discovered and applied. In the
third all pretence is given up, and new rules and new stand-
ards are avowedly invented and imposed.
It is long before the political organization of a society
is well enough developed to take over the work of lawmak-
ing as a proper function of government. Those who ex-
ercise the powers of a society in the beginnings of a legal
order do not think of making law. They think of recogniz-
ing law which has an independent existence as ethical cus-
tom or precepts of religion. At this stage the state has
not become the paramount agency of social control. The
governing authority in a modern state may recognize law
found at hand or may make new law. But the idea that
law may be made and that the state has not only the power
but the duty of making it is relatively modern. It came to
Germanic peoples through the influence of Roman law, as
it was said, iuxta exemplum Romanorum, with the idea of
union of all political powers in a sovereign who can make law
by exercise of will. Modern legislation comes from Con-
stantinople rather than from Rome. The maturity of law
is marked by regular and frequent resort to legislation as
the agency of change and improvement. Legislation, in-
deed, exists before this stage of legislation. What, how-
ever, marks the stage of legislation in the development of
a legal system is the use of legislation not as an instrument
of occasional legal revolution, but as the regular, everyday
agency of growth and development of law.
For example, compare in Roman law the period from
Augustus to Diocletian with that from Diocletian to Jus-
tinian. In the Roman law of the classical era the agency
of growth was juristic science largely under the influence
of the theory of natural law. The regular, everyday de-
velopment of the law took place through juristic writing.
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Here and there changes were made by occasional statutes
but it was not'till the third century that the balance begins
to incline toward the imperative element. After Diocletian,
juristic writing substantially comes to an end, and from
Diocletian to Justinian growth takes place through legisla-
tion. In the same way compare sixteenth, seventeenth and
eighteenth-century English law with that of the nineteenth
and of the twentieth century. Allowing for the legislation
of Henry VIII and of the Commonwealth, none the less al-
most all growth down to the nineteenth century took place
through judicial decision or juristic writing. On the other
hand, the great reform movement of the nineteenth century
was legislative. The rise of the Court of Chancery and the
absorption of the law merchant marked a reforming of the
law through the traditional element. The nineteenth-cen-
tury reform movement, inaugurated by Bentham, involved
a substitution of the imperative for the traditional element.
Note also workmen's compensation legislation and the re-
form of English real property law by legislation in the
present century. Compare German law before the empire
(the Pandektenrecht) with the German law of the twentieth
century in which legislation overwhelmingly preponderates.
Also compare the minute American legislation of today on all
sorts of matters of private law with the all but purely
judicial and juristic development which went before. Un-
questionably in the modern state the growing point of the
law has shifted to legislation.
In the modern state the chief activities are not war and
religion, as in antiquity, but administration and legislation.
Both of these are growing at the expense of the traditional
elment, the purely professional element, in legal systems.
Instead of leaving all or nearly all controversies to tribunals
which apply traditional guides to decision, the modern state
more and more seeks to forestall controversy by legislatively
prescribed rules or summarily adjusts relations through ad-
ministration. Within a generation in common-law jurisdic-
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tions administration has replaced judicial application of
both legislative and traditional rules and standards over
great domains of social control.
Nineteenth-century science of law usually contrasted ad-
ministration with law. But the real contrast is between ad-
ministrative and judicial application of law, using the term
"law" to mean a body of authoritative precepts as guides to
conduct and to determination of controversies. The judicial
process assumes an authoritative general rule or standard
prescribed in advance of action and a measuring of action
more or less mechanically by that rule or standard. It is
true there is in practice no small administrative element in
judicial decision. Nevertheless the ideal is one of treating
each case as an example of a type of case governed by a
universal rule. In administration the characteristic idea is
to guide action in the particular case, or to substitute ad-
ministrative action by a hierarchy of administrative officials
for individual action governed by general legal precepts.
Administration belongs to a busy age in which all things
are so specialized that we must have a multitude of things
done for us. Matthew Arnold's school boy may have been
wiser than he knew when in his essay on Nelson he wrote:
"His last words were: Every man expects England to do
his duty." Primarily, administrative activity is supervisory,
with legislative prescribing of ends and limits.
Along with this supervisory activity the modern state
maintains a parallel activity in laying down authoritative
rules and standards in advance. Instead of leaving rules
and standards to develop or be developed by judicial ex-
perience and juristic science and so pass into the traditional
element of the law, the modern state more and more insists
on substituting the will of the lawmaking organ of the state,
declared and promulgated authoritatively, for the traditional
premises and precepts of the legal system. I have compared
administration to the traffic officer at the corner or the cross
roads, and legislation to the lines on the pavement.
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To some extent the rise of legislation as the chief agency
in legal development and so as the principal form of law
was but a phase of the general democratic tendency in
politics. It was conceived at least that legislation involves
a democratization of the administration of justice; that just
as the exclusive possession of law by a priestly caste was
replaced by the Twelve Tables, so an exclusively scientific
and professional lawmaking was replaced by popular law-
making. Purely traditional and professional standards were
replaced by popular standards. But they are often of
popular origin only in theory. Class and local interests of
some particular trade or business can procure or influence
legislation, which requires no premises, where it cannot in-
fluence juristic or judicial development which assumes
premises. Compare statutes as to innkeepers with the lia-
bility of innkeepers at common law. Often the jurist-made
or judge-made rule takes account of the more interests. As
has been said, it seems reasonably evident that legal systems
are in a stage of legislative development. But a reaction is
not unlikely. Division of labor in a highly organized in-
dustrial society involves a specialization and reliance upon
experts and agencies of preparation for which legislation of
the parliamentary type is hardly adapted. Some signs of a
new tendency, at least as to purely legal matters (i.e. non-
political) may be seen in delegated legislation by administra-
tive rules and orders, in leaving legal procedure to rules of
court, and in setting up of judicial councils with a function
of advising both legislatures and courts.
We may now turn to the history of legislation as an
agency in the growth of law. Five stages in the develop-
ment of legislation on purely legal matters may be suggested
for convenience of treatment: (1) unconscious legislation
in the period of customary law; (2) declaratory legislation
in the period when the traditional law is reduced to writing;
(3) selection and amendment when by the political union
of peoples having in some particulars divergent customs it
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becomes necessary to choose in declaring the custom of the
new whole; (4) conscious constructive lawmaking, as an
occasional expedient at first to meet political exigencies, but
gradually to effect important changes here and there in the
legal system in emergencies; (5) habitual legislation as an
ordinary agency of legal development, often culminating in
codification of the entire legal system.
1. Unconscious legislation. I speak here of the begin-
nings of law, i.e. of law in the analytical sense; not of the
beginnings of social control but of the beginnings of a spe-
cialized form of social control by politically organized so-
ciety. In the first stage of legal development, the stage of
traditional modes of decision based upon repeated decisions
by supposed inspiration, a great deal of unconscious law-
making goes on. The case in hand may not be exactly one
which has arisen previously, but those who have the custody
of the tradition assimilate it thereto. Or they may warp
the tradition more or less unconsciously to meet new needs.
Maine describes how he saw this going on in India. "In
point of fact," he says," . . . the various shades of the power
lodged with the village council under the empire of the ideas
proper to it, are not distinguished from one another, nor
does the mind see a clear difference between making a law,
declaring a law, and punishing an offender against a law.
If the powers of this body must be described by modern
names, that which lies most in the background is legislative
power, that which is most distinctly conceived is judicial
power. The laws obeyed are regarded as having always
existed, and usages really new are confounded with the really
old." Again he says: " . . . if very strict language be em-
ployed, legislation is the only term properly expressing the
invention of customary rules to meet cases which are really
new. Yet, if I may trust the statements of several eminent
Indian authorities, it is always the fact or the fiction that
this council only declares customary law." A like phe-
nomenon is to be seen in Hebrew law. Just as, using law
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to mean the body of received precepts, the judge precedes
the law historically, so historically the court precedes the
legislature. The judicial function is the first to be conceived
distinctly, since the first problem of the legal order is simply
to decide peaceably. The legislative function is the last so
to be conceived. Logically according to the idea of separa-
tion of powers we have first a lawmaker who makes laws
and second a court which applies them. But this is not the
actual course of legal development.
2. Declaratory legislation. All legislation for a long time
in the history of a legal system is of this type. It is not an
authoritative making of new laws, it is or is taken to be an
authoritative publication of law already existing. Thus, ten
patricians reduced the ius ciuile to writing in the Twelve
Tables. Theretofore it was an oral tradition. The prologue
to the Senchus Mor, the great book of the Brehon (old Irish)
law tells how the "bards" came together and recited the
traditional law to St. Patrick. The prologue to the Lex
Salica tells how certain old men from the villages of the
Salian Franks were brought together and wrote out the cus-
tomary law. Remnants of this idea persisted in Roman law
in the formula by which the assembly of the people rejected
a proposed lex - antiquo, i.e. let the customary law be
stated as it was stated of old, and the reiterated proposition,
which seems to us today to go without saying, that the later
legislative enactment prevails over the earlier. A remnant
may be seen in the common law in Blackstone's seventh rule
of statutory interpretation: "Where the common law and a
statute differ the common law gives place to the statute;
and an old statute gives place to a new one." The idea of
the declaratory nature of legislation hung on for a long time.
But if statutes were declaratory of custom it might be asked:
Why was not the older declaration the more reliable?
3. Selection and amendment. A certain conscious mak-
ing of law takes place where choice must be made between
conflicting traditions or conflicting traditions must be harmo-
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nized through amendment. This necessity arises whenever
an attempt is made to declare the common custom of a
political unit formed by the union of formerly distinct tribes
or people with customs of their own. An example may be
seen in Alfred's laws. He tells us he had to pick and choose
and even amend, but that he "durst not set down much of
[his] own." There is a like disclaimer in the laws of Howell
the Good. From this there is an easy progress, but one long,
only occasionally and gradually achieved, to intentional and
avowed making of laws as something wholly new.
4. Conscious constructive lawmaking. A first step in this
direction comes when men perceive that by changing the
written record of the law they can change the law, which
theretofore had been held eternal and immutable. Usually
at this point a legislative ferment sets in, e.g. the early re-
publican legislation at Rome, the Frankish capitularies on
the Roman imperial model, the legislation of Edward I on
the Byzantine model. But this outburst of legislation is
commonly soon superseded by a purely professional de-
velopment of the law and it is not until the maturity of legal
systems that we enter upon a real stage of legislation.
There is little conscious constructive lawmaking till a legal
system reaches the stage of equity and natural law. It comes
first with the theory of natural law; of a law as a declara-
tion not of custom but of natural law. It becomes wholly
conscious in the maturity of law, with the analytical theory
of law as a body of laws and of laws as made, not found.
AGENCIES OF PREPARATION FOR LEGISLATION. In the
Roman polity the executive presented laws to the popular
assembly for acceptance or rejection. In the English polity
the popular assembly leaves the larger share in initiating and
shaping of laws to those of its own members who are also
members of the executive government. In the United States
and in most Continental countries, the assembly delegates
the elaboration of laws to committees of its own body. An-
other characteristic of English legislation is also significant
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in the present connection. "For lawyers' law Parliament has
neither time nor taste." In consequence, since hitherto
Englishmen have insisted on being governed by fixed rules
rather than by official discretion, legislation as to private
law, when not declaratory, has taken the form of rules, pre-
scribing definite detailed legal consequences for definite de-
tailed states of fact rather than principles. The latter are
left to judicial finding and development. It should be noted
also that in Great Britain "the executive of the United King-
dom exercises greater control over legislation than prob-
ably the executive government 'of any other country with
popular institutions."
1. Public agencies. In England,, important legislation is
for the most part preceded by some form of official inquiry
and is based for the most part on the reports and recom-
mendations of a commission or a committee. The inquiry
is usually made by a royal commission or by a parliamentary
committee, or by a departmental committee. In the United
States, the category of public agencies of preparation for
legislation has been greatly extended and varied, and no
less than ten may be distinguished.
(1) Legislative committees. In England, a parliamentary
committee is appointed by one of the two houses, or there
may be a joint committee of the two. The committee is ap-
pointed by the house from its own members or in case of a
joint committee each house selects members from its own
membership. The institution is very old. As far back as
the fourteenth century there is record of the appointment
of a committee to draw a statute from a particular petition.
Also in the sixteenth century Sir Thomas Smith tells us:
"The Committees are such as either the Lords in the higher
House, or the Burgesses in the lower House, doe choose to
frame the Lawes upon such Bils as are agreed upon, after-
ward to be ratified by the same Houses." A parliamentary
committee can compel attendance of witnesses and produc-
tion of documents and can examine witnesses under oath.
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But these powers, important for political investigations, have
no significance for legislation on legal questions. It can only
sit while the House which set it up is sitting, comes to an
end with the expiration of the session, and must be provided
for anew if it is to go on at a following session.
In contrast to the English system of special committees,
it is the general practice in the United States to have stand-
ing committees, of which the Judiciary Committee is the
important one for the present purpose. These committees,
like the English special committees, do not extend beyond
the legislative session. But continuity of legislative action
is sometimes provided for by intersession committees. Also
some states have joint committees of the two Houses, and
the joint judiciary committee is of service in advancing de-
sirable measures for improving law and the administration
of justice. In our earlier legislative history all bills origi-
nated in committees. It was then a common practice to
instruct a standing or a select committee to inquire into the
expediency of enacting a statute on a particular subject and
report with or without a bill to the House. But this is done
today only in very exceptional cases. Bills introduced by
individual members are referred to a committee. They may
be amended by the committee without limit, or the com-
mittee may draw up and report a substitute measure. In-
stead of the committee drawing the bills in the first instance,
it is now expected to put bills referred to it in proper shape.
Today the work of legislative committees is chiefly one of
recommending adoption or rejection or of amending or re-
shaping what has been drawn up by others.
(2) Commissions. In England, when legislation in-
volving fundamental changes in the common law is proposed
it is usually thought advisable or even necessary to appoint a
royal commission. Such commissions are constituted and the
members are appointed by the Crown, on the advice of a
minister, to inquire into some particular subject preliminary
to legislation or executive action. Unless a statute so pro-
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vides, they cannot compel attendance of witnesses nor pro-
duction of documents, and cannot examine witnesses under
oath. But it does not appear that their work has been seri-
ously hampered by not having compulsory powers. They are
more representative than parliamentary committees. Usually
there is no fixed limit of time and the commission goes on
until the chairman or majority feels that it is time to stop.
In a decade after the first world war a majority of the com-
missions finished their work in less than a year. Three years
was the extreme period. On the whole, English experience
of the system has been satisfactory. There has been some
criticism. But whatever the deficiencies of commissions
may have been in connection with far-reaching social re-
forms, they have amply proved their worth as an agency of
preparing legislation on law reform. One need only cite the
Real Property Commission, the Common Law Procedure
Commission, and the Judicature Commission.
Commissions for revising and codifying laws have been
familiar in American legislation from an early period. But
commissions for particular subjects are a matter of the
present century. They have been used in connection with
Workmen's Compensation Acts, Mining and Factory Laws,
and Land Title Registration. They have, however, much
more prestige in Great Britain than in the United States.
Indeed, royal commissions have certain advantages over
American governmental and private agencies of inquiry.
They have back of them a long and, on the whole, success-
ful history. They have something of the prestige and ap-
pearance of aloofness from politics which attaches to the
Crown. They may reasonably expect their recommenda-
tions to be at least supported by the government under
whose auspices they were appointed. In the United States,
on the other hand, governmental investigations, whether
executive or legislative, tend to be partisan or to be suspected
of partisanship, and the ensuing proposals are likely to en-
counter opposition in want of accord between the two de-
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partments of government. Where commissions have worked
out and formulated bills on non-political legal subjects, it
has been noted that "the result is generally a measure well
thought out and well formulated. Even where the subject
is very controversial, the unity of the original draft secures
a consistent and coordinated whole."
Both in Great Britain and in the United States, com-
missions are used mostly for subjects of general political
significance. They are not much used for what is called
lawyer's law - the body of guides to decision by which
everyday relations of man with man are adjusted. But a
conspicuous exception is the statutory commission in New
York "to investigate defects in the law and its administra-
tion." The statute made it the duty of the commission "to
investigate any defects it may find in the present law and in
its administration; and to recommend such changes as are
necessary, to modify or eliminate antiquated and inequitable
rules of law and methods of administration, to remove
anachronisms in the law, and generally to bring the law
of this state, civil and criminal, into harmony with modern
conditions." It made two short reports, suggesting some
minor improvements in the law, and recommended a per-
manent Law Revision Commission, which was provided by
statute in 1934. Its functions are substantially those laid
down in the Act of 1923. It has made seven reports con-
taining important studies of particular defects in the law
of the state and recommendations for legislation.
(3) Legislative councils. In the British dominions,
bodies of a mixed legislative and advisory character have
been made part of the legislative body with authority to
prepare for or recommend or initiate legislation. Such a
body in New Zealand did not prove satisfactory. In the
United States there has been legislation providing for
councils composed of members of the legislature, appointed
in" the same manner as the standing committees of the two
houses, and of other citizens appointed by the Governor,
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or of members of the legislature appointed by the President
of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representa-
tives and confirmed by a majority vote of the respective
houses. Their function is "to present specific and detailed
proposals for legislation on any major question of state
policy" (Wisconsin) or to "cooperate with the administra-
tion in devising better methods of administration and law
enforcement" (Kansas).. These are, as it were, standing
legislative commissions analogous to those considered above.
(4) Reference bureaus. Legislative reference and draft-
ing bureaus as organized in many states have done much
incidentally in the way of preparation for legislation. But
they are not organized for the investigation and research
which is called for in the society of today.
(5) The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Al-
though these commissions are appointed by the Governor in
each state and so act under public authority, the initiative
came from the American Bar Association and the Bar
Association and the Commissioners have worked in close
cooperation from the beginning. At the organization of the
American Bar Association in 1878 the constitution then
adopted declared as one of its purposes "to promote the ad-
ministration of justice and uniformity of legislation through-
out the Union." From the beginning the Association had
maintained a standing committee on jurisprudence and Law
reform which had made some important recommendations.
But a decisive step was taken in 1889 when a special com-
mittee on uniform state laws was appointed. In 1890, the
legislature of New York adopted "An Act to Provide for the
Appointment of Commissioners for the Promotion of Uni-
formity of Legislation in the United States." Among other
things, it was to be the duty of the commissioners to con-
sider whether it would be advisable for the state to invite
the other states of the Union to send representatives to a
convention to draft uniform laws to be submitted for ap-
proval and adoption by the-several states. At the annual
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meeting of the American Bar Association the same year the
Association recommended the passing by each state, and by
Congress for the District of Columbia and the territories, of
a statute providing for the appointment of commissioners to
confer with commissioners from other states on the subject
of uniformity of legislation. As a result, the first National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws was
held at Saratoga, New York, in August, 1892, immediately
preceding the annual meeting of the American Bar Associa-
tion at this same place. At first, but nine states were
represented. Since 1912 all states, territories, and the Dis-
trict of Columbia have been represented by commissioners
officially appointed. The Conference meets annually im-
mediately preceding the meeting of the American Bar Asso-
ciation. In most of the states the governor appoints three
commissioners by authority of a statute. In the others he
appoints them under his general executive powers. They
are chosen from members of the bar and serve without com-
pensation. In 1896, the Conference adopted and recom-
mended to the states the Uniform Negotiable Instruments
Law, which was soon adopted in all jurisdictions. It has
since drafted a series of important statutes on commercial
law which have been generally adopted and have done much
for improvement of that subject.
(6) State bars. In an increasing number of states the
legal profession has been organized in a self-governing
corporate body as the state bar. One of the duties of such
a body is to further the administration of justice by consider-
ing and recommending legislation for improving the law.
Bar associations as private agencies have done much in this
way, particularly toward the improvement of legal procedure.
Carried on by state bars, this work done in the immediate
past by voluntary bar associations as a private activity,
makes the incorporated bar, as an organized body of officers
of the courts, a public agency of preparation for legislation.
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(7) Executive recommendations. In the English polity
bills of importance and the far greater proportion of those
which become laws are introduced by some member of
the executive who is also a member of parliament and are
put in form by the government draftsman, the parliamentary
counsel to the treasury. The content is supplied by some
government department. The form is given by the govern-
ment draftsman. In the United States, no such system of
executive preparing and initiating legislation on any large
scale has obtained. But in the present century something
of the sort has been growing up. Bills are drawn up at the
instance of and actively promoted by the executive. The
preliminary research, however, is likely to be done in or
under the auspices of some administrative department or by
some private agency.
(8) Research in administrative departments. In Eng-
land, a "departmental committee" is appointed by the
political head of the department concerned and consists of
such persons, officials or others, as he may select. In recent
years it has been more usual to set up such committees than
to appoint royal commissions. As to preparation for legis-
lation as to private law, the most notable example of such
a committee is the Law Revision Committee, appointed by
the Lord Chancellor on January 10, 1931, "to consider how
far, having regard to the statute law and to judicial decisions,
such legal maxims and doctrines as the Lord Chancellor
may from time to time refer to the committee, require re-
vision in modern conditions." This committee has made
eight reports from 1934 to 1939, upon such important sub-
jects of private law as contribution between tort feasors,
survival of causes of action and civil liability for causing the
death of a human being, liability of a husband for the torts
of his wife and liability of married women in tort and con-
tract, questions under the Statute of Frauds, questions as
to the requirement of consideration in simple contracts, and
contributory negligence.
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In the United States, in 1930 President Hoover authorized
the Attorney General, with the assistance of the Department
of Commerce, to "undertake an exhaustive investigation of
bankruptcy law and practice" with a view of laying "founda-
tions of fact upon which sound conclusions and wise remedies
may be predicated." But for the most part official studies
and investigations in this country have come to be made
by administrative agencies by their own staff with such as-
sistance as they may call in, and not merely in preparation
for legislation but more often as the basis for administrative
action.
(9) Judicial Councils. In 1921, the Massachusetts
Judicature Commission recommended the setting up of a
judicial council. Ohio provided for one by statute in 1923,
and Massachusetts did the same in 1924. More than half
of our jurisdictions now have judicial councils and they have
become an established institution. Their organization varies
somewhat in the different states, but in general they are
made up of judges of the appellate courts and courts of first
instance, members of the legislature, and practising lawyers,
and in many cases also a certain number of lay members; all
serving gratuitously. They provide an official and con-
tinuous agency for looking into the work of the courts, con-
sidering their organization, facilities and methods in relation
to their tasks, investigating the operation of the laws which
the courts must apply, and discovering defects in the law and
places where improvement is needed whether in substantive
law, procedure, organization of the work of the courts, or
methods of conducting it. They recommend legislation when
need of it is indicated, but also recommend rules of court
and improvements of method requiring no rules. Many of
these councils publish notable annual reports containing use-
ful materials toward the improvement of the law and of the
work of the courts. In 1929, a National Conference of Ju-
dicial Councils was organized. It has been active in making
the work of each council available to the others, in giving
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unity to efforts to improve the administration of justice as
to matters of general, not merely local concern, and in pro-
viding studies which must go before effective legislation.
Five volumes of the Judicial Administration Series published
by the Conference have this purpose. The Conference works
in cooperation with the American Bar Association's Com-
mittee on Improving the Administration of Justice, as well as
with the Section of Judicial Administration and the Junior
Bar Conference of that association, in surveying judicial ad-
ministration of justice throughout the land.
(10) Conferences under public authority. Since 1908,
conferences of the governors of the several states have been
held at the instance of the President at some of which legis-
lation on matters of law has been considered. Also sectional
conferences of governors have been held frequently since
1930, but these conferences have had to do with economic
questions. Of more importance in preparation for legisla-.
tion as to the law is the federal Conference of Senior Circuit
Judges. The National Association of Attorneys General is
affiliated with the American Bar Association. The activities
of this Association and the conferences of judges, of district
attorneys, and of other officials having to do with adminis-
tration of justice or enforcement of law, which have come
to be held commonly in connection with meetings of state
bar associations, are not held under public authority and are
voluntary. But their recommendations carry a certain
weight as coming from officials. The work of the Institute
of Government at the University of North Carolina in pro-
moting such conferences is especially noteworthy.
(11) Ministries of justice. These agencies of prepara-
tion for legislation are not known to common-law jurisdic-
tions. But review of the public or quasi public agencies
which have developed in the United States, chiefly in the
present century, to do the work of such institutions, shows
a want of permanence and continuity, a want of adequate
organization and facilities for research, and above all a too
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
restricted scope and purpose, so that many serious gaps in
or defects of the law and defects of the administration of
justice fall down between them. While we expect the state
to furnish service in increasing measure, we do not bear in
mind that efficiency of the greatest and the basic service it
may render is thus impaired.
2. Private agencies. (1) Committees of professional,
trade, and business associations. Characteristically in the
United States we have left the greater part of preparation
for legislation to private initiative. On the whole, the most
active of the private agencies in the past have been profes-
sional, business, and trade associations through their legisla-
tive committees. One of these agencies, namely, the bar as-
sociation, has done outstanding service in promoting law re-
form, especially with respect to practice and procedure, com-
mercial law, and criminal law. This has been increasingly
manifest in the several states in the present century, as the
reports of the committee on law reform in every recent
volume of state bar association reports bear witness. The
American Bar Association in particular has many outstand-
ing achievements to its credit in recommending, drafting, and
advocating remedial legislation as to procedure and as to
substantive private law.
(2) Associations and other organizations interested in
social and economic problems. Such organizations have
often brought together experts upon some subject of special
interest to them and prepared and recommended model or
standard acts which have been widely utilized in legislation.
To give but one example, in 1923, the National Probation
Association drafted a Standard Juvenile Court Act. The
draft act was discussed at two succeeding annual conferences
and was approved and published in 1925. A second edition
in 1927 and a third in 1933 were revisions as to some de-
tails. In 1941, the Association sent a questionnaire to one
hundred and twenty-four judges, probation officers and social
workers asking for opinions on controverted questions of
SOURCES AND FORMS OF LAW
juvenile court legislation. On receipt of the answers in 1942,
a committee of nineteen (ten judges of juvenile courts, two
probation officers, two representatives of child welfare or
children's bureaus, two practising lawyers, two experts on the
staff of the Association, and one teacher of criminal law) to
revise the Standard Act completely so that it might "con-
tinue to serve as a model embodying the best judgment of
the present day." The draft drawn by this committee was
approved and published in 1943. The standard act has been
used extensively in recent legislation on the subject. Fruit-
ful work of this sort has been done by many such organiza-
tions.
(3) Private individuals. It has happened more than once
that individuals have planned and drafted important legisla-
tion. A notable example is the work of Hiram T. Gilbert,'
Esq. in working out the plan and drafting the statute for
the Municipal Court of Chicago. His idea of court organiza-
tion was much in advance of the time (1904) and is still in
advance of what is generally believed in by the legal pro-
fession.
(4) The American Law Institute. This important or-
ganization must be spoken 'of fully in another connection.
Its primary work has been upon the traditional element of
our law and if codification were to come would probably be
the basis of the codes. But it has drawn up two notable
drafts in preparation for legislation, namely, the draft Model
Code of Criminal Procedure and the Model Youth Correc-
tion Authority Act.
(5) Research in Universities and Institutes. In the for-
mative era of American law, in the time before the Civil
War, most of the research needed for lawmaking in pioneer;
rural, agricultural America could be done in a law library.
It could be confined to law reports, law text books, and
statute books. In the relatively simple social and economic
order of a century ago the judge, the law teacher, the law
writer, and the lawmaker could find in his own experience,
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or in the general knowledge of his neighbors, all that he
needed beyond what was in his law books. The social and
economic background of making and the application of laws
required little study. Mostly it was patent to the observa-
tion of an intelligent man without special training or special
study. Today, on the other hand, there is no generally dif-
fused body of knowledge as to what is required for the ef-
fective adjustment of law to the life it is to govern. The
problems are not obvious, nor are the application to them
of the historical materials, when discovered, or the needed
adaptations of the legal machinery to the problems, when
defined, any more obvious. Such things today call for co-
operative effort of scholars in more than one field assisted
or advised by experts of practical experience in many direc-
tions. In Story's day one man could work upon many sub-
jects. Today many men must work upon one subject.
It is futile to expect that the needed preliminary work of
searching for, organizing and making available the data re-
quired for lawmaking, judicial law finding, and administra-
tive enforcement will do itself spontaneously or may be done
by the old machinery of legislative committees, working un-
der pressure upon a mass of bills, of courts deciding con-
troversies on local fragments of national questions under
limitations of jurisdiction, venue, and parties, and of ad-
ministrative agencies tending to treat every case as unique.
Even more it is futile to expect solid results from research
done to order for some special interest or done in a com-
mercial or partisan spirit. The needed research must be
done cooperatively by scholars and experts of many types
in many subjects uniting their learning, their organized ex-
perience and their trained energies in a joint effort. It must
be carried on for its own sake in a scientific spirit. It must
be done not upon single controversies as they arise but upon
the whole field out of which controversies arise. It must
enlist long and patient labor on the part of scholars not hur-
ried by a demand that they show "results" at once or fill
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out an annual report at regular intervals. If we cannot have
a ministry of justice, we may turn to our universities, where
the conditions of effective systematic legal research may be
assured. Something has been done already in or under the
auspices of such institutions. In particular a good start was
made by the Institute of Law of Johns Hopkins University.
(6) Research under the auspices of foundations. Pri-
vately endowed extra-academic foundations are also in a
position to meet the conditions of systematic legal research,
and some of them have done not a little upon which law-
making has been able to build.
AGENCIES OF LEGISLATION. Agencies of authoritatively
establishing the precepts which make up the imperative ele-
ment of a legal system are either primary or secondary.
1. Primary agencies. The primary agencies derive their
authority immediately from the constitution of the state.
Bryce, thinking of Roman law and English law, speaks of
them as "the supreme authority in the state." But al-
though this is true of centralized polities, where, as in the
United States, the polity is based on a separation of powers
and the legislative, executive and judicial are co-equal, the
supreme authority is in that from which the constitution
proceeds, which, therefore, can amend it, and the primary
agency of legislation is not the supreme authority but is the
lawmaking organ which that authority has set up.
2. Secondary agencies. Lawmaking authority may be
derived directly from the constitution and so may be pri-
mary, or it may be derived from a primary agency of legis-
lation by devolution or delegation and so may be secondary.
(1) Devolved legislative power. "Devolved" is the best
word I can find for a type of legislative authority which
seems to me to need distinguishing from delegated lawmak-
ing authority. At common law the estate of the ancestor
is said to devolve upon the heir. Devolution means transfer
as a whole from one person to another, as when the whole
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property of a bankrupt passes to the trustee in bankruptcy,
whereas delegated means that one person has conferred a
power on another to act as his agent or representative in
doing something. I got the word from discussions of sover-
eignty a generation ago when a devolved sovereignty was
spoken of in such connections as Canada and Australia. Re-
cently English writers have spoken indifferently of devolved
and delegated lawmaking powers. But it may well be asked
whether the legislation of the Dominion of Canada, or of a
Canadian provincial legislature, or of an American territorial
legislature, is to be regarded as on the same footing with
rules made by an administrative bureau under authority
of an Act of Parliament or of an Act of Congress or of a
state legislature or of a territorial legislature.
(2) Delegated lawmaking. The Statute of Proclama-
tions of 1539 was not so much a case of delegating lawmak-
ing power as one of recognizing and defining a residual pri-
mary legislative authority of the Crown. Perhaps the same
may be said of an Act of 1602 delegating to the local peace
officers the appointment of local sanitary officers and giving
them such directions as necessity might require in an epi-
demic of plague. Also in 1710 the Privy Council was em-
powered to make rules for quarantine during an epidemic
of cholera, and the courts held that disobedience of an order
in council establishing quarantine was a common-law mis-
demeanor. After the industrial revolution the number of
commissions and statutory boards steadily increased and
more and more power of making rules and orders was con-
ferred upon them in order to remove purely administrative
matters from the domain of statute lawmaking and so relieve
Parliament. In 1855, by the Metropolis Local Management
Act it was enacted that the Crown in council might suspend
or alter any of its provisions upon petition to the Privy
Council that difficulties had arisen in administering it. After
1900, legislation delegating powers of lawmaking to adminis-
trative agencies became more frequent, but the so-called
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Henry VIII clauses, clauses giving orders under the Act the
effect as if enacted therein or prescribing that the making of
an order or administrative confirming of a scheme under the
Act should be conclusive evidence that all the requirements
of the Act had been complied with, for the most part belong
to the nineteenth century. After the first world war, eking
out of statutes which touch only the high spots, filling out
the details by administrative rules and orders, had become
the ordinary course in British legislation. In 1921, there
had come to be two volumes of statutory rules and orders
annually to one of statutes, and the rules and orders took
up five times as many pages. Most of the important statutes
of today provide that the King in Council or some depart-
ment or board or official may make rules or regulations for
carrying it out in detail.
(a) Municipal lawmaking. This is the oldest form of
secondary legislation in our law. But before taking up the
usual mode of municipal lawmaking by ordinance it is neces-
sary to look at a more recent type which has grown up under
constitutional provisions for municipal home rule. Under
such provisions in state constitutions instead of deriving a
certain lawmaking power from the legislature, as granted by
a charter, the municipality gets its authority direct from the
constitution. In these municipal home rule provisions in
state constitutions, and in municipal charters adopted under
them, do we have a case of devolution of legislative power
upon municipalities analogous to devolution of the power of
Congress over the territories upon territorial legislature?
(i) Municipal home rule charters. In some state con-
stitutions the devolution as to matters of municipal concern
is complete. The municipality is given power to adopt a
charter either with plenary or with limited lawmaking au-
thority. In others, the authority is limited to ordinances in
accord with the laws of the state. Under such a provision
it was held that the term "laws" included the common law
as well as the statutes and hence the charter could not der-
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ogate from the common-law liability of the city for re-
stitution in case of unjust enrichment. But as to purely
municipal affairs municipal lawmaking may abrogate a
statute and substitute another rule for it within the munici-
pality. The constitution, however, may give power to the
city, not to the city council, so that the city must adopt a
charter giving full lawmaking power to the council in order
to authorize departure from the general law of the state.
The devolution by the constitution is a grant of power so
that only such authority belongs to the city as is granted.
But the people of the city may frame their government as
they choose by making the charter they adopt either a grant
to the city government of the powers granted by the con-
stitution or a limitation of those powers. If a grant, noth-
ing is given beyond what is granted expressly or by implica-
tion. All else is reserved to the people of the city. If a
limitation, all is given which is not withheld either expressly
or by implication.
Whether matters are of purely local or of state-wide and
general concern has not proved easy of determination. It
has been held that doubts should be resolved in favor of the
state, and hence that driving motor vehicles in the street, in
view of the general travel by automobiles, is not a purely
municipal matter. But another court, where the state law
fixed twelve tons as the maximum load to be carried by
motor vehicles in city limits while the ordinance of a city
under constitutional provision for home rule fixed the limit
at ten tons, held that the ordinance governed. Fixing of
rates for public service companies carrying on in the munici-
pality has been considered not to be a power necessary to
local self-government so that state legislation will prevail
over municipal regulation.
Thus some jurisdictions presume in favor of the state, e.g.
considering travel by motor vehicles a state concern even
where it is done in municipalities on the local streets and
hold fixing of rates for local public utilities a matter for the
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state legislature. Others presume in favor of the municipality
even where municipal control affects general travel. A
problem of balance is presented not unlike that between
federal and state government, between the general security
and the individual life and between society and the in-
dividual.
(ii) Municipal ordinances. Here we have to do with.
municipal establishing of rules having the force of laws under
a charter granted by the legislature as distinguished from
municipal lawmaking under constitutional provisions giving
the people of a municipality the powers of the state legis-
lature as to purely local affairs.
Blackstone tells us that certain powers are "necessarily
and inescapably incident to every corporation, which inci-
dents, as soon as the corporation is duly erected, are tacitly
annexed of course." Among these, he says, is a power "to
make laws or private statutes for the better government of
the corporation, which are binding in themselves unless con-
trary to the laws of the land, and then they are void." This,
he adds, "is also included by law in the very act of incorpora-
tion." Kent, too, speaks of the power to make by-laws (as
they are called in England and often in the United States,
though they are more usually called ordinances with us) as
an incident of being a corporation. But, he adds, although
this is a necessary and inseparable incident of a corporation,
it is more usual in the United States to specify this and other
powers in the charter. What sort of power is this? Is it
like that of a territorial legislature or of the people of a
city under a constitutional home rule charter, or is it like
the rule-making power of an administrative agency?
In a case often referred to, the court, citing a standard
text book, said: "There can be no doubt but that it is
competent for the General Assembly to delegate to corpora-
tions of this character the power to enact ordinances 'which,
when authorized, have the force and effect of laws passed by
the legislature of the state within the corporate limits.' . ..
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Within the sphere of their delegated powers municipal cor-
porations have as absolute control as the General Assembly
would have if it had never delegated such powers and ex-
ercised them by its own laws." It will be noted that the
court speaks of ordinances which are authorized. That is,
on a subject with respect to which authority has been dele-
gated. Where there is no devolution of a general power of
legislation as to matters of local concern by constitutional
provision, an ordinance "must be shown to be authorized by
the express provision of the charter, or be derived as an in-
cidental power resulting from its incorporation as a city,
or be found in some general or special statute." Moreover,
ordinances made under this delegated authority must be
reasonable. In this there is an important distinction between
the devolved power of a territorial legislature and the dele-
gated power of a city council under a legislative charter.
There is no affirmative requirement that acts of the legisla-
ture be reasonable. At most there is the constitutional pro-
hibition as to deprivation of life, liberty, or property with-
out due process of law. This may forbid arbitrary and un-
reasonable legislation. But it is one thing to forbid what is
arbitrary and unreasonable and another to require it to be
shown to the courts that a by-law or ordinance is reason-
able. Where a particular matter of purely municipal con-
cern is committed by the statute which serves as the munici-
pal charter to municipal regulation, an ordinance which is
reasonable and within the delegated authority will be given
effect although it differs in detail from the general statute
governing municipal corporations. It is otherwise, however,
where the matter is one of state and not purely local concern.
As to the incidental power of lawmaking, involved in the
mere creation of a municipal corporation, the legislature
may define or limit so as to leave nothing to implication.
(b) Judicial rule-making. A great step forward was
taken in legal procedure when in England in 1873 the
Judicature Act left the matter to rules of court instead of
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an elaborate practice act or code of civil procedure. The
absolute supremacy of Parliament in the British polity pre-
cludes any but a purely academic question as to the nature
of the power now exercised by the judges. But, as we have
come to appreciate the importance of the change from
statutory rules to rules of court, questions have arisen in
the United States because of the constitutional separation
of powers and the strict provisions with respect thereto in
some state constitutions. How are regulation of the details
of legal procedure, admission to practice in the courts, both
preliminary and professional education and examination of
applicants and details of the required qualifications, the dis-
cipline of the profession and review of disciplinary proceed-
ings, and organization of the bar, to be regarded for the
purposes of the constitutional categories? Is the legislative
lawmaking power exclusive as to all or some or some part
of these, or is the rule-making power with respect to all or
some one or some part of them inherent and exclusive in
the judiciary, or are the two departments of the government
coequal as to these matters, the one supplementing the other,
or is the power when exercised by the courts a delegated
one? Moreover, if it is a delegated power, is the situation
like that when rule-making power is delegated to a munici-
pal corporation, or shall we say that the whole power, where
of doubtful classification, has been assigned by legislation
to a coordinate branch of the government appropriate to
exercise it and so is like a devolved power, even if, as in case
of devolution of legislative power upon a territorial legisla-
ture, it may be withdrawn?
It is well settled that the separation of powers provided
for in our constitutions does not prescribe an exact analyti-
cal scheme. Experience soon showed the impossibility of
drawing fine analytical lines and, as actually drawn, the
lines in many places are historical. For the present purpose
the language of the Supreme Court of Ohio is apt: "What
constitutes judicial power, within the meaning of the con-
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stitution, is to be determined in the light of the common law
and of the history of our institutions as they existed anterior
to and at the time of the adoption of the constitution."
Looked at in this way the judiciary is clearly an appropriate
department to regulate the details of procedure by rules of
practice. The common-law courts and the Court of Chancery
in England had regularly exercised this power down to the
Revolution and it was not until the New York Code of
Civil Procedure of 1848 that legislative regulation of every
detail became the fashion. As to the superior courts of
common law, when Tidd's Practice, setting forth the pro-
cedure in England which we received in this country was
published, practice was governed by a series of "General
Rules and Orders" made by the judges, of which the oldest
then in force in the King's Bench went back to 1604. The
oldest then in force in the Common Pleas was made in the
reign of Henry VI (1457) and no less than six general rules
of procedure made by the judges in that year were still in
force. In the Court of Exchequer, general rules made as far
back as 1594 were still in force. At the time when our
American courts of equity were set up Bacon's "ordinances"
or orders as to chancery practice, with some modifications
by later chancellors, governed procedure in equity and are
the foundation of the old equity rules of the Supreme Court
of the United States which, as revised in 1913, governed
in the Federal courts till 1938. We inherited this system of
regulating procedure by rules of court.
But although a claim has been made for an inherent ex-
clusive power in the courts, a historical claim may also be
made for regulation of procedure by statute. In Tidd's
Practice there is a long list of statutes as to details of legal
procedure, if we take for a starting point a time when Par-
liament as a legislative body and the King's courts had be-
come clearly differentiated, beginning with a statute of Ed-
ward III as to error (1340) and including such outstanding
statutes as that of Elizabeth with respect to special de.
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murrers and Anne as to jeofails. It would seem therefore
that we are on safer ground in regarding the rule-making
power as one of doubtful classification - one which both
analytically and historically might be regarded as either
judicial or legislative - which hence may be exercised by
the courts or may be assigned by the legislature to the
judiciary as an appropriate department. That legislative
elaborate codes of procedure and practice acts and continual
tinkering with the details of procedure have been the bane
of American administration of justice is now well recognized.
Hence we could wish the subject belonged to the courts ex-
clusively. Where it is assigned to the courts as a power of
doubtful classification, there is the difficulty that the legis-
lature may change some particular detail by statute, as like
as not at the instance of some one with political influence
and little or no competence for the task. In this way legal
procedure comes to be cumbered with rigid details raising
unnecessary questions of interpretation and difficult of im-
provement or elimination. But it would require something
more than the usual constitutional provision as to the
separation of powers to establish this. The most we can be
sure of is that the power exists in the absence of legislation,
that it may be assigned as a whole to the courts by legisla-
tion, and that there is ground to hope that legislatures hav-
ing assigned it to the courts will come to keep their hands
off.
A stronger case historically may be made for contend-
ing that the courts have an inherent and exclusive power of
prescribing the qualifications and making rules for admission
of those who are to practice before them. A number of
courts so hold. But the legislature may enact statutes in
aid of this power. Admission to practice is everywhere held
purely judicial and to be exercised by the courts only. Many
courts, however, consider that the legislature may, in order
to protect the public, prescribe reasonable rules and regula-
tions for admission, but not such as to deprive the courts of
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their inherent power to lay down additional rules and con-
ditions and to make finally the order of admission. There
has been little tendency to regard the power as one of doubt-
ful classification which may be exercised by the legislature
or assigned by it to the courts. But at least one jurisdiction
seems to regard it as a legislative power. The same argu-
ments apply to integration of the bar, and the courts have
been agreed in holding it a judicial not a legislative function.
(c) Administrative lawmaking. In the United States,
administrative making of rules and orders with the force
of law is not all of one kind nor all upon the same basis. It
is not inherent in an administrative agency, unless with
respect to details of procedure before it. It may result
simply from legislation conditioned upon executive action.
It may result from devolution or delegation of authority
with respect to powers in the no-man's land between the
legislative and the executive. Noteworthy examples of the
lAtter are devolution of rate-making power upon commissions
and delegation of the application of standards with an in-
cidental rule-making power.
Where the taking effect of a statute is made to de-
pend upon executive action, so that a power is given
to the executive to determine whether or when the statute
or some part of it shall take effect, there is no delegated law-
making. The statute is to take effect upon condition, and a
condition of executive proclamation or a condition of some
natural event or some situation of fact in the present or in
the future are equally legitimate. Leaving ascertainment
and pronouncement of the existence of the event or situa-
tion of fact to the executive is not delegation of legislative
power. But suppose executive action is not made a condi-
tion of taking effect but it is left to the executive to deter-
mine the extent of operation of the statute or some part of
it in time and space? In such case it may be that the
statute provides a standard which the executive is to apply
in reaching a determination. The legislature may leave to
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an administrative agency a discretion in formulating tests
to carry out the standard prescribed in the statute. What
if the determination is left to a standard to be fixed by the
executive or to the absolute discretion of the executive or
of an administrative agency? If the standard is not fixed
by the legislature but it declares a policy to be carried out
by administrative fixing of a standard by regulations hav-
ing the force of law, are we to say that the legislature may
delegate application of a standard, as a power of doubtful
classification but not implementing a policy by standards
not prescribed or fixed by law? Implementing the legisla-
tively prescribed policy by administrative fixing of standards
is the same process as that of the French polity which ex-
pects general provisions in statutes to be made effective by
administrative ordinances. To the extent that the policy
is clearly defined so that there is a measure for the regula-
tions this is within the principle of a statute taking effect or
operating upon condition. Thus the condition may be a
natural event, or the will of an executive or administrative
official, the popular vote at an election (as in local option
legislation), facts to be ascertained by some official or ad-
ministratire agency, compliance with a standard fixed by
the statute but to be applied by the executive or some ad-
ministrative agency, or left to the executive to fix in carry-
ing out some legislatively defined policy. In some cases a
power of dispensing with or exempting from a statute has
been given to an administrative official as a matter of per-
sonal discretion. It might be said that the official's discre-
tion was a condition of operation of the statute. But where
it was made a ground of exemption with nothing to indicate
on what basis it was to be exercised, it was held to go be-
yond a condition of taking effect or of operation and amount
to executive legislation in a matter not of doubtful classi-
fication. However, delegation of the application of a stand-
ard established by a statute may involve a certain fixing
of limits. Here we are in the field of powers of doubtful
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classification and the legislature may assign this to an ap-
propriate department.
Devolution of plenary rate-making power as to public
utilities upon administrative boards and commissions raised
a different question. Rate-making power had been said to
be legislative and legislatures had long exercised it. Could
it then be turned over to a board or official requiring to be
classified as part of the executive department? The old
Commerce Court considered that Congress could fix a stand-
ard to be applied by an administrative commission or could
leave it to a commission to determine whether or not condi-
tions existed on which the taking effect of a statutory pro-
vision as to rates was to depend, but that the commission
could not be given power to fix rates in its own discretion.
This, it was considered, would be a giving of legislative
power to the commission. In reversing the decree of the
Commerce Court, the Supreme Court of the United States
was more clear as to the result than as to the reason. Chief
Justice White said that it was absurd to hold "that the au-
thority in question was validly delegated so long as it was
lodged in carriers but ceased to be susceptible of delegation
the instant it was taken from the carrier for the purpose
of being lodged in a public administrative body." This
ignores the real question. Fixing of rates was never dele-
gated to the carrier. A reasonable rate could be agreed on.
The carrier in publishing a rate offered it as a reasonable
rate. If the carrier insisted on it and the patron had to pay
it, the carrier could be sued at law to recover the unreason-
able excess. When the legislature fixed a rate, it deter-
mined by a rule of law what was conclusively a reasonable
rate, precluding any agreement. Later, Chief Justice Taft,
in his eulogy on Chief Justice White speaks as if there were
nothing but a question of delegation of power, whereas the
question was whether a legislative power might be dele-
gated to an agency of the executive department. For some-
times the courts, with a sound instinct for the right result,
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did not see how to meet squarely the difficulty that here was
a power always held to be legislative which was conferred
on a body clearly part of the executive. The true solution,
that these are cases of legislative assigning of a power of
doubtful classification to an appropriate department was at
least foreshadowed in Village of Saratoga v. Saratoga Gas
& Electric Light Co., 191 New York, 123. As has been
seen above, Chief Justice Marshall had long before pointed
this out as to judicial regulation of procedure by rules of
court. Thus devolution of rate-making power is entirely
consistent with the separation of powers.
Delegation to administrative officials and bodies of ap-
plication of standards may be disposed of in the same way.
The power of applying them had been exercised by the
courts. But application of the standard of due care was
left to juries, and application of the standard of conduct
imposed on fiduciaries had been exercised by courts of equity
in an administrative fashion. Analytically the power might
be held either judicial or administrative. Thus in turning
it over to administrative agencies as to particular standards
the legislature is only assigning a power of doubtful classi-
fication to an appropriate department. But how is it as
to delegation of a power of fixing standards to such agencies?
Application of a standard to the individual case is of
doubtful classification. Implementing by supplemental
regulations a standard established or recognized by legisla-
tion may be so far a power of doubtful classification as to
be assignable to administrative agencies as between the
legislative and the executive departments. Where the line
is not easy to draw or doubtful, it is for the legislature to
draw it. A standard cannot be wholly objective. It has to
be applied in view-of times, places, and circumstances. Wit-
ness the standard of the reasonable prudent man in the law
of torts, the standard of reasonable facilities in the law of
public utilities, the standard of fair conduct of a fiduciary in
equity, the standard of fair competition in the law on that
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subject, and the standard of acts tending to corruption in
the common law of misdemeanors. The standard established
by a statute need be no more clearly defined than these in
order to admit of leaving implementation as well as ap-
plication to an administrative agency. But an administra-
tive regulation setting up a new rule outside of the statute,
and not in furtherance of the standard it establishes, is not
allowable, and the legislature must "erect guide posts" which
will enable the administrative official or agency to carry out
its will. The English courts do not have to consider ques-
tions as to a constitutional separation of powers. All that
comes before them is whether the prescribed mechanics of
making and promulgating the rule or order have been
observed, and whether the rule or order is within the power
conferred. The courts construe the statutes liberally even
when "against common right" so that they would be con-
strued strictly at common law.
As to the mechanics of administrative lawmaking, it came
to be the English practice to require laying of rules on the
tables of both houses of Parliament, the rules to have effect
as if enacted in case neither house within a time fixed an-
nulled them by resolution. But some statutes gave regula-
tions and orders made under it the effect of an Act of Parlia-
ment upon confirmation by an executive official. In such
case it was held that if a rule contravened or went beyond
the statute under which it was made the courts might hold
it invalid upon certiorari, distinguishing cases where the rules
had been laid before Parliament. It has been pointed out
that supervision by Parliament is often ineffective and may
be impossible, that review by the courts is often excluded
because the rules made by administrative agencies are re-
quired to be regarded as if enacted in the statute, or because
they have been laid before Parliament and so cannot be
questioned although Parliament has never actually con-
sidered them, and that submission to an administrative of-
ficial, particularly to the busy head of a great department
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of the executive, is no real check. In the United States,
legislation has sometimes required judicial rule-making as to
procedure to be laid before Congress, to become effective
in the absence of Congressional action in a certain time, or
has sometimes required rules to be filed with and confirmed
by some executive official. Often the rules are put sub-
stantially beyond effective judicial scrutiny.
Want of effective checks in the mechanics of adminis-
trative lawmaking raises one of the most important prob-
lems of our public law.
(3) Autonomic lawmaking. Autonomic (giving law to
itself) is a term which comes from the power of towns and
guilds, and associations to legislate for themselves in the
Middle Ages. A development of it in Continental Europe
from the fourteenth century was a power of noble families
to enact family statutes for their internal family concerns,
regulating succession to their titles, heirlooms, family seats,
and the like.
A power of associations to make rules and regulations hav-
ing the force of law is recognized at common law. Today
it is often expressly conferred on private corporations by
general statute or by charter. But there is no requirement
of express statutory or charter power to make such regula-
tions or by-laws. It is a power inherent in such organiza-
tions. A bit of history is involved here. Corporations and
organizations on the model of the organized kindred are
older than politically organized society. There were so-
cieties and organizations of this sort in antiquity which
governed themselves and were a strong agency of social con-
trol when the state was feeble and only developing its power.
This situation recurred in Germanic law. Associations are
older than the state. They had a rule-making power when
Parliament was in its infancy. In the sixteenth century the
state became the paramount agency of social control. But
the rule-making power had come down from conditions of the
past. It did not need to be given by the state although now
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recognized by and exercised in subordination to the state.
It is exercised by private corporations, especially public
utility companies, but also by groups or associations such as
fraternal and benevolent orders and associations, mutual and
fraternal insurance organizations, religious societies, busi-
ness associations, e.g. chambers of commerce, stock ex-
changes, and produce exchanges, professional associations,
e.g. bar associations and medical societies, trade unions, and
social clubs. The rules are as binding upon those affected by
them as are statutes, so that members who complain of their
application must exhaust their remedies under the rules be-
fore going to the courts. Also such rules and regulations are
subject to judicial scrutiny as to their reasonableness. They
not only bind members, but public service companies can
make regulations which may bind their patrons and even
those who come on their premises to deal with their patrons.
The basis of the binding authority of such rules has often
been referred to contract - a contract of each member with
the others or of patron with public utility. But in case of a
contract the law recognizes the intention of the parties to
bring about legal consequences and gives their agreement the
intended effect. In autonomic lawmaking, members of the
body who dissent at the time of making the rules and those
who join after they are made are none the less bound. When
it is said that the dissentient members have by joining con-
sented to be bound by rules to be made and those who join
after they are made have by joining consented to the rules
then existing, the same implied agreement is resorted to by
which eighteenth-century writers justified the binding force
of laws enacted by the legislature.
RELATION OF THE IMPERATIVE TO THE TRADITIONAL ELE-
MENT. Until recently not the least notable characteristics
of American law were, on the one hand, the excessive out-
put of legislation in all our jurisdictions and, on the other
hand, the indifference amounting sometimes almost to con-
tempt with which that output was regarded by lawyers, law
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teachers, and text writers. Text writers who scrupulously
gathered up from every remote corner the most obsolete de-
cisions and cited all of them, seldom cited any statutes ex-
cept those landmarks which had become a part of our
American law, or, if they did refer to legislation, did so
through the judicial decisions which applied it. This was
especially true in the last quarter of the nineteenth century,
but hardly less true in the first decade of the present cen-
tury. The courts likewise have inclined to ignore important
legislation, sometimes deciding it to be declaratory, at other
times silently assuming it was declaratory, citing prior de-
cisions and making no mention of the statute. Eminent
lawyers as legislators often conceived it expedient to make
of a statute the barest outline, leaving details of the most
vital importance to be filled in by judicial lawmaking. It
was fashionable to point out the deficiencies of legislation
and to declare that there were things which legislatures could
not do, try how they might. It was the settled practice-to
preach the superiority of the law found by judges. In this
way a wide gulf grew up in the legal system between the
traditional (one might say the judicial) element and the im-
perative element. Instead of becoming parts of one body
of law they became in some measure competing bodies of
law, and in this way uncertainty was brought about. More-
over, the influence of the law established by judicial de-
cision often determines the course of reforming legislation
and holds it back. Four ways in which courts in such a
legal system as ours might deal with an innovation in the
law are conceivable. (1) The courts might receive the in-
novation fully into the body of the law as affording not only
a rule to be applied but a principle from which to reason,
and hold the principle so established superior in authority
to judge-made rules on the same general subject as being
a later and more direct expression of the general will. Ac-
cordingly, they might reason from the legislatively intro-
duced precept by analogy, that is, might reason from its
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principle in cases not within its purview by analogy to rea-
soning from a pre-existing judicially established principle.
For example, at the end of the nineteenth century and in the
beginning of the present century, legislation in the way of
so-called anti-trust laws everywhere in the United States
adopted a principle of repression of combinations where
they threatened free individual action or free competition in
business or industry. Here conceivably might have been a
starting point for reasoning by analogy. But such is not
the technique of the common law. The courts continued to
resort to the traditional common law except as to cases
within the statutes and indeed molded the statutes to the
common law in the course of applying them. There has
been a certain practical reason for continued adherence to
the common-law technique in this connection. Our legisla-
tion too often is not on any clear theory consciously worked
out. Legislation in civil-law countries is apt to be much
more expert as to legal matters. However, the reason for
the difference in this respect between the two systems is
historical.
(2) The courts might receive the legislative innovation
fully into the body of the law, to be reasoned from by
analogy the same as any other legally established proposi-
tion; regarding it, however, as of equal or coordinate au-
thority as a basis for reasoning with the judicially established
precepts on the same subjects. Thus there might be a choice
between competing equally authoritative starting points for
legal reasoning, something which happens not infrequently
as between principles of the common law and is the chief
source of difficulty when new questions come before the
courts.
(3) The courts might refuse to receive the legislative
innovation fully into the body of the law, and instead give
effect to the legislative enactment directly only. That is,
they might refuse to reason from it by analogy, but never-
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theless give it a liberal interpretation to cover the whole
field it may reasonably be made to cover.
(4) Or finally, the courts might not only refuse to rea-
son from the legislative provision by analogy and insist upon
applying it only directly as a rule rather than as giving a
principle, but they might also give it a strict and narrow
interpretation, holding it down rigidly to the exact cases
which it clearly covers expressly. This fourth hypothesis
represents the orthodox common-law attitude in the nine-
teenth century toward legislative innovations. Probably the
third hypothesis represents more nearly the attitude toward
which the course of decision has been tending in the present
century. The second and first hypothesis in the past ap-
pealed to the common-law lawyer as absurd. He has seemed
unable to conceive that a rule of statutory origin may be
treated as part of the permanent body of the law except in
the case of certain landmarks of old legislation which have
been incorporated into the traditional element of our law.
It is submitted, however, that when the growing point of a
legal system shifts definitely to legislation, the legal system
must come at least to the method of the second hypothesis.
That the attitude of the common-law courts toward legis-
lation is not necessary to and inherent in a legal system is
apparent when we turn to a great legal system in which it is
wholly unknown. Not only is this view of legislation un-
known to the Roman law, but quite the opposite doctrine
was established in countries following the modem Roman
law even before they adopted codes. Indeed, the Romans
developed the more significant part of their law of private
wrongs by the analogy of the lex Aquilia, and the modern
Roman law carried this still further by making Aquilian fault
the basis of a whole theory of liability. In the same way,
the modern Roman law worked out liability for death by
wrongful act on the analogy of the edict de deiectis et effusis
and the text of the Digest based upon it. The idea is that
the jurists have developed the principle which they find be-
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hind the text, exactly as a common-law court, in reasoning
from the analogy of a leading case, finds a principle behind
it and gives the principle further development. Indeed,
Coke developed the legislation of Edward I and the signif-
icant chapters of Magna Carta in this way in his Second
Institute. But the relative scantiness of legislative lawmak-
ing and growth of the law through judicial decision after the
thirteenth century, until the legislative reform movement in
the nineteenth century, led to loss of the method which Coke
employed so effectively. In civil-law countries, under the
modern codes it is a matter of course.
An example of the common-law mode of dealing with
legislation in this respect may be seen in the judicial applica-
tion of Lord Campbell's Act. If any piece of legislation has
become universal in common-law jurisdictions it is legisla-
tion to permit of recovery for causing death by wrongful act.
Such legislation has surely been in force long enough to be
thoroughly incorporated in the law. Moreover, its policy is
regarded everywhere as sound and just. Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court of the United States has thought of it as
introducing a mere innovation of detail which is not at all to
be thought of as on the same footing with common-law
doctrines. In the same spirit the Supreme Court of Missouri
laid down that while every physical interference with the
person of another short of killing is presumptively wrong-
ful, killing is not presumptively wrongful but must be shown
to have been wrongful by the party complaining, since it
gave rise to no action at common law. Likewise if a statute
makes a sale or agreement void upon grounds not declara-
tory of the common law, one who depends on that ground
must plead it specially. But if what would otherwise be a
contract is void at common law or because of a statute de-
claring void what was void at common law, advantage of
the defence may be taken under the general issue. Indeed,
so rooted in the mind of the common-law lawyer is this idea
of the role of legislation in the legal system that a majority
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of the Supreme Court of the United States could hold that
a husband could not maintain an action in the Canal Zone
for wrongfully causing the death of his wife because the
code there in force, although in language used in all the
codes in civil-law jurisdictions and substantially everywhere
held to allow such an action, as was also true in the civil
law before the codes, was in terms of a general principle and
did not make a specific provision for the case.
Another feature of this common-law notion of a sharp
division between the traditional element and the imperative
element whereby, as it were, the imperative element is re-
garded as an intruder in the body of the law, is a doctrine
of strict construction of statutes in derogation of the tradi-
tional element. -It is said commonly that three classes of
statutes are to be construed strictly, namely: (1) penal
statutes; (2) statutes in derogation of common right; and
(3) statutes in derogation of the common law. There is
more justification for some of these categories than for
others. With respect to the doctrine that penal statutes are
to be construed strictly it may at least be remarked that
political liberty requires clear and exact definition of the
offense which is to be visited with loss or impairment of life,
liberty, or property. In the same way, .he rule as to sta-
tues in derogation of common right has some excuse in Eng-
land where there are no constitutional restrictions on legisla-
tion. It really is but a way of saying that interpretations
which involve mischievous consequences are to be avoided.
In the United States, it means that interpretatious which
would make an act unconstitutional are to be avoided.
Whenever it is applied beyond these limits it is without ex-
cuse and is only an incident of the historical attitude of the
common-law courts toward legislation. The proposition that
statutes in derogation of the common law are to be con-
strued strictly has no analytical or philosophical justification.
It assumes that legislation is something to be deprecated.
As no statute of any consequence dealing with any relation
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of private law, unless declaratory, can be anything but in
derogation of the common law, under this doctrine the social
worker and the legal reformer must always face the situation
that the legislative act which represents the fruit of their
labors will find no sympathy in those who apply it, will be
construed narrowly, and will be made to achieve as little as
possible. Yet the doctrine has been extolled as a funda-
mental principle of jurisprudence by those American writers
who adhered to Savigny's views as to the futility of legis-
lation.
In consequence, we have in this country two opposing
theories of the relation of courts to legislation, neither of
which, I submit, should be accepted. First, there is the
political theory, proceeding on an extreme analytical theory
of the separation of powers. According to this theory courts
can only interpret and apply. All making of law must come
exclusively from the legislature. Courts "must take the law
as they find it" - as if they could always find it ready-
made. They are without power to improve it. To do any-
thing but adhere narrowly to the old books is said to be
usurpation. The attempt to put this in practical operation
in Frederick the Great's draft code and later in the Prussian
Landrecht of 1794 failed. Much the same thing happened in
France. The French Civil Code provided that the judges
should not decide a cause in such a way as to lay down a
general rule. Nevertheless, at the end of one hundred years
French jurists were compelled to admit that the exigencies
of the administration of justice had made of the usus fori
or course of decision in the courts, and even single decisions
of the court of ultimate review, a form of law.
Second, there is the juristic (historical) theory that law
cannot be made. While, on the one hand, the political doc-
trine in this country has been that the judicial function is
purely one of application of rules made by the legislative
organs of the state or established extra-judicially in a re-
ceived custom, the juristic doctrine, the doctrine of courts
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and lawyers and law teachers has been that legal precepts
could not be made by any one but were only discovered and
that the legislative attempt to bring forth a legal precept
depending upon -the legislative will for its authority was
simply futile. Here, as in the political theory, an eighteenth-
century idea is at the bottom. Each develops a phase of the
natural-law idea that lawmaking is declaratory. The one
sees an attempt at authoritative pronouncement of a rule
of natural law. The other sees a formulation of a precept
found by judicial experience. As statements of the whole
truth of the matter these theories are equally to be rejected.
But we are concerned here more with the juristic theory,
which has become part of the traditional element of Ameri-
can law, and its corollary that legislative provisions in
derogation of the common law are to be construed strictly.
This rule was derived from one that statutes are to be con-
strued by the common law; i.e. are to be fitted into the entire
body of the law and so are to be taken to have been meant
to be a harmonious part of the legal system. Hence the old
authorities laid down that courts were to construe together
common law and statute upon the same general subject, as
rules in pari materia. Statute and common law should be
construed together just as statute and statute must be. But
fitting into the body of the law a statute not made primarily
as an innovation is a very different matter from holding that
when a statute does purport to change the law on some point
radically it is to be construed narrowly and strictly and given
as little effect as construction can allow. "The general
words of an act are not to be so construed as to alter the
previous policy of the law, unless no sense or meaning can
be applied to those words consistently with the intention of
preserving the existing policy untouched." So put, it goes
beyond the proposition that a statute is to be taken to alter
the law only where it expressly purports to do so, a proposi-
tion which has been regarded as "an essential guiding rule,
for without it the continuity of legal development would be
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gravely imperilled." A distinction must be made, however,
between a change of detail not necessarily affecting a general
policy, and a change of the whole policy of the law as to a
large field, such as in the Workmen's Compensation Acts.
A rule which makes for continuity of development in the
legal system is certainly of no mean importance. But there
are other considerations at least no less important. When
the rule requires disregard or impairment of the policy of
legislation changing the common-law doctrine as to matters
of the highest concern in the urban, industrial society of to-
day, the common law may have to be adjusted to the statute
rather than the statute to the common law.
A number of abuses in state legislation in the United
States in our formative era led to drastic provisions and re-
strictions in state constitutions which go far to explain the
persistence of the common-law attitude toward statutes
which is a feature of the Anglo-American legal tradition.
Instead of legislatures and courts working together toward
the ends of law, if they were not in conflict in the last cen-
tury they tended each to be suspicious of the other. Partly
this was an inheritance from the seventeenth-century Eng-
lish polity upon which ours was built. Partly it was in-
volved in the application to legislation of our common-law
doctrine of the supremacy of the law. Partly, perhaps, it is
a phase of the general regime of non-cooperation of inde-
pendent agencies of government, each pursuing its own ways
independently, which was characteristic of pioneer America
on every side. In the form which the doctrine took in the
nineteenth century it was shaped by professional reaction
against the legislative reform movement, strengthened later
by the reading of Savigny or his followers on the part of
American jurists.
Not only must we reject the doctrine of strict construc-
tion of legislation in derogation of the common law, but we
must come to regard legislation on matters of legal signifi-
cance (as English writers put it, "lawyer's law") as part
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of the law so that where a policy is shown at variance with
that received at common law, the policy may be resorted to
in analogous cases in order to choose a starting point for
judicial reasoning when choice has to be made between start-
ing points of equal authority. This is not spurious inter-
pretation. It is not meant that the statute is made under
the guise of interpretation to cover what it does not cover.
Rather it is meant that the statute is to stand as part of the
legal system no less than judicially found precepts of the
common law, so that the principle it affords may be used
as the basis of reasoning no less than a principle afforded
by cases decided upon a policy which legislation has re-
jected. There is, one must admit, a difficulty, and one which
has weighed heavily in keeping up the traditional attitude
of the lawyer toward legislation. Legislation is by no means
so consistent in pursuing and adhering to a policy as is
judicial decision. Unhappily, acts of the same session and
on the same subject and even at time different sections of
the same act proceed upon different theoretical bases or
considerations of policy. Moreover, even now, after much
improvement, legislation in the English-speaking world is
by no means habitually well drafted. Something more than
mechanics of drafting is required to make statutes and the
body of the law a harmonious system. But judicial opinions
are not always easy to understand and much that courts
lay down has to be explained or distinguished or modified
in later cases.
In recent decisions there have been some signs of recogniz-
ing the policy of a statute as a basis of legal reasoning on




HISTORY AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF CODIFICATION. 1. The
Status of codification in the common-law world. When the
legislative reform movement was at its height in the middle
of the nineteenth century, there was a strong movement for
codification both in England and in America. Discussions
of codification were the staple of juristic controversy in Eng-
land down to about 1875, and in the United States down to
about 1880. In England, the matter went so far as to pro-
duce a number of drafts of codification of the law on par-
ticular subjects. The drafts are now well known text books.
A Royal Commission on Digest of the Law was appointed
and made some progress in the way of experimenting with
drafts on different plans. But interest in the matter died
out perhaps because of the rise of social legislation, divert-
ing attention from "lawyer's law," and the Judicature Act
and sweeping reform of procedure from 1875 to 1890
through rules of court. In the United States from 1848 to
about 1880 the matter was much agitated and a vigorous
and protracted controversy arose in New York over the draft
codes prepared by David Dudley Field. Here, also, before
the end of the century interest had waned. In the present
generation interest has revived in England and a new move-
ment for codification seemed to be setting in when it was
arrested by the first World War. Thus in September, 1910,
codification was the subject of a discussion at the provincial
meeting of the Law Society at Bristol. Lord Robson in an
address about that time favored codification and considered
it inevitable. In 1912, Sir Frederick Pollock said that codi-
fication of English law was perfectly feasible and was to be
expected in the near future. In the United States, the
matter is still dormant, but it seems reasonable to think that
a revived interest in it must be expected and that codifica-
tion is not unlikely to be one of the chief problems of Ameri-
can law in the next generation.
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To the common sense of the layman nothing could be
more clear than that the whole body of the law, the whole
body of precepts by which justice is administered, by which
relations are adjusted, by which conduct is regulated in
civilized' society, may be and ought to be reduced to def-
initely formulated statements and set down in chapter and
verse of a published code. Indeed, the layman acts upon
this faith whenever he is called upon to adjust relations or
regulate conduct in some matter which the law leaves open
to government by private agencies. One may vouch the
most diverse phenomena in support of this proposition. He
may vouch the printed "rules and regulations" posted in any
establishment where many persons are employed. He may
vouch the elaborate codes of rules for games - the laws of
whist, the baseball rules, the football rules. He may vouch
the elaborate constitutions and by-laws framed for clubs and
associations and fraternal orders. He may vouch the army
regulations. He may vouch the lawmaking of men who find
themselves without law in a pioneer environment, as in the
case of the Mayflower Compact or the District Rules of the
pioneer miners on the public domain. In every connection
and as a matter of course the ordinary man formulates a
code. Nor is it easy for him to understand the obstinate op-
position with which lawyers in all times have met his de-
mand that the same course be taken with the law of the
land. Whenever and wherever he attains political power,
the layman begins to legislate. He sets out to formulate
the law in definite written precepts.
Thus the subject of codification is intimately connected
with the idea of a written law. It is a form of the demand
for a complete, intelligible, authoritative statement of the
precepts governing individual relations and individual con-
duct. It is a phase of the demand that every man shall be
assured of knowing what he may do and what he may not
do. It is related to the idea behind our bills of rights. It
is a part of the quest of a government of laws and not of
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men; it is part of the claim that men be assured that the
magistrate shall regulate their conduct and adjust their re-
lations according to pre-established law and not in ac-
cordance with his more or less arbitrary will. It has to do
with an important aspect of the social interest in the general
security in that it is one means of excluding the personal
element in the administration of justice and thus of insur-
ing uniformity, equality, and certainty. Indeed, the idea
of a written law is urged not only to assure these things,
but in order to make the lay public believe that they are
assured. For if it is important that justice be done, it is
no less important that people feel justice has been done.
The stability of the legal ordering of society depends quite
as much upon the latter as upon the former.
A whole book could be written on the subject. But it
will be enough to give an outline of the history of codifica-
tion, of the controversy over the advisability of codification,
and of the different ideas of what a code should be and
what we may hope to achieve through a code.
2. Ancient and modern codes. Codification in the modern
sense begins in the maturity of the Roman law. The so-
called ancient codes, authoritative publication of traditional
law, are attempts to secularize the law in transition from
the stage of undifferentiated social control to the strict law,
i.e. to law in the lawyer's sense. They are not lawyer's
codes. They precede lawyers. Codes in the modern sense
come after a full legal development and simplify the form
of developed law, systematize and harmonize its elements,
and formulate its principles. They are lawyers' codes. But
there is likeness in this that each sums up a past develop-
ment and puts it in form to serve as the basis for a juridical
new start.
3. Codification in Roman law. The maturity of Roman
law had inherited a tradition of reduction of the law, or at
least of the written law, to systematic form either of a single
statute or of a compilation. Down to the codification by
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Justinian, the Twelve Tables (450 B. C.) remained the
theoretical foundation of the ius ciuile. There was at least
a tradition of a collection of the leges regiae by a certain
Papirius, and a commentary on this collection is referred
to in Justinian's Digest. We are told that Julius Caesar
had among other plans one of making a digest of the law,
reducing the ius ciuile to a certain method and bringing to-
gether in the fewest books what was best and essential in
the vast and diffuse mass of statutes and writings. In the
reign of Hadrian the praetor's edict was revised and given
permanent form by legislation. Under Marcus Aurelius,
one Papirius Justus made the first collection of imperial
legislation of which we have knowledge. Also in the first
third of the third century the great jurist Paul (Iulius
Paulus) made two collections of imperial decisions having
the force of legislation. In the reign of Diocletian (about
291) Gregorius published a collection of the earlier constitu-
tions (enactments) of the emperors, and a little later (per-
haps about 295) Hermogenianus published a like collection
of the constitutions of Diocletian. None of these have come
down to us. They are known only from quotations in later
compilations or citations in the codification by Justinian.
The collections by Gregorius and Hermogenianus were called
codes from the word codex meaning here a book of leaves
of parchment in distinction from a roll of papyrus. They
were private compilations analogous to such things as the
United States Compiled Statutes put out by the West Pub-
lishing Company before the official compilation called the
United States Code.
In 429, Theodosius II planned a complete codification.
He appointed a commission to compile the imperial legisla-
tion after Constantine. This was to be preliminary to
putting the whole -law in one compilation, including what
was still in effect both in the preliminary compilation of
legislation ordered as well as in the prior compilations, and
what was of importance in the writings of the jurisconsults.
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This ambitious plan failed. But .a new commission ap-
pointed in 435 was directed to compile the legislation after
Constantine and authorized to make alterations needed to
fit the order and style of the code. This official compila-
tion, completed and promulgated in 438 (to take effect in
439) is known as the Theodosian Code (Codex Theodo-
sianus). It is not a code in the sense in which we speak
of the French Civil Code or the German Civil Code, but is
simply an authoritative compilation of legislation. It is of
the same kind as the official compiled statutes of one of the
United States except that the compilers had no power of
eliminating the obsolete such as is usually given to the re-
visers of our state legislation. Compilations of American
state statutes are often called codes. They are to be com-
pared with the Statutes at Large. In the latter the laws
are in chronological order, not classified or in systematic
arrangement. In the former they are arranged logically and
systematically, all the laws on any one subject being brought
together and arranged in a title or chapter; and sections
of the same act may be taken over into different titles or
chapters. The code of Theodosius was of the latter type
as compared with collections after the manner of the Statutes
at Large.
In 528, substantially one hundred years after Theodosius
planned a complete codification, Justinian, at the instance of
Tribonian who might be called his minister of justice,
planned to republish the whole body of Roman law in
statutory form. The first step was the appointment, the
same year, of a commission of ten, made up of magistrates,
advocates, and one law professor, to compile a new codex
to be a complete revision of the imperial legislation, omitting
everything obsolete, eliminating contradictions and repeti-
tions, making needful additions, changes, and consolidations.
In preparation for this Justinian abrogated a number of
obsolete rules, altered others, and settled controverted ques-
tions which had arisen under the pre-existing law. This
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code was completed in a year and enacted, and all the pre-
existing legislation not incorporated therein was repealed.
The next year (530) Justinian proceeded to compile and
systematize the traditional element in the Roman law of
his day and to give the compilation legislative authority.
To this end he appointed a commission of sixteen, made up
magistrates, advocates, and four professors of law, two from
the law school at Constantinople and two from the law
school at Berytus. The traditional element at this time was
all contained in the treatises of the great jurisconsults and
commentaries thereon. Accordingly, this commission was
ordered to make a systematic collection of extracts from
those writings, extracting whatever was still of practical
use, eliminating what was obsolete or superfluous, reconcil-
ing contradictions, and deciding controverted questions by
adopting one view or the other. To do this they were al-
lowed to alter the text of the extracts chosen; but in other
respects they were to and did preserve the form of the ex-
tracts and state from what writer and book they were taken.
In preparation for this task it was thought best to clear the
way by determining certain juristic controversies and
abolishing certain obsolete institutions referred to in the
classical texts. This was done by a series of constitutions
which seem to have been published as a collection and are
known as the Fifty Decisions. The work of digesting the
juristic writings was done rather hastily in three years and
the Digest (or Pandects) was given statutory authority in
533, all further use of the original writings being expressly
forbidden. In fifty books (about 900 double column royal
octavo pages) it digests the Roman juristic writings from
the generation before Cicero to the time of Constantine,
much as the Century Digest digested American case law
before 1896. It differs from an Anglo-American digest of
case law in two respects: It is arranged systematically in
books and titles in the traditional order of the edict, not
alphabetically, and it does not repeat (at least theoretically
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it does not), giving only one chosen extract for each point.
It is not an index to the law. It is an authoritative ex-
pression of the law.
A new edition of the Code had to be made to conform
to the changes in the law made while the Digest was com-
piling. This was drawn up by a commission of five and
enacted in 534, the first code being repealed.
Also an institutional book primarily for students, in large
measure a new and revised edition of the institutional book
of the classical period, the Institutes or Commentaries of
Gaius, was drawn up by a commission of three (Tribonian
and two professors of law) and was given statutory au-
thority in 533.
The subsequent legislation of Justinian was brought to-
gether in an unofficial collection, not a compilation, which
we call the Novels. This was no part of Justinian's re-
publication of the law, but it is part of what we now speak
of as Justinian's codification - the Corpus Juris Civilis.
It will be seen that this is not like what we think of as
a code today. It is as if we gave statutory authority to (1)
a revision and compilation of the statutes; (2) a digest of
our case law; (3) a modern edition of Blackstone's Com-
mentaries. But it was a great achievement. It put in
systematic form the results of a thousand years of develop-
ment of Roman law so that in the twelfth century it could
serve as the basis of a juristic new start. Indeed, the Digest
has been a quarry for jurists ever since.
4. The modern codes. (a) The forerunners. In the
modern world the first important legislation which might be
called a code is the Constitutio Criminalis Carolina (Penal
Code of the Emperor Charles V [1552]), commonly called
the Carolina, although the Emperor had very little to do
with drawing it up or enacting it. It eliminated many abuses,
and did away with obsolete rules of proof. It stood as the
basis of criminal law in the domain of the German Roman
Empire for more than three hundred years.
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There had been proposals of codification in France as far
back as the reign of Louis XI (fifteenth century). In the
sixteenth century codification was urged by Dumoulin, voted
by the States General in 1560, and attempted to the extent
of a compilation of the principal provisions of the royal
ordinances in force under Henri III by Brisson about 1580.
A code was recommended by the States General in 1576,
and again in 1614, but nothing was done. Some progress,
however, was made in the seventeenth century under Louis
XIV. The circumstances made for codification at this
time. In the first place, there were two systems of law in
France. In the north of France, in what was called the pays
du droit coutumier, there was the customary law, partly a
feudal land law, not unlike the English land law in Little-
ton's Tenures in many ways, and a body of local customary
law differing in each province, and indeed often in each
locality, representing the Germanic law as worked out in
local jurisdictions but eked out with a great deal of Roman
law which had come into use in the tribunals. In the south
of France, the pays du droit crit, the Roman law was more
thoroughly received. Secondly, France of the seventeenth
century was a highly centralized monarchy and the French
jurists and publicists had given currency to a Byzantine
theory of sovereignty which was thoroughly suited to the cir-
cumstances of the French government of the time. Accord-
ingly, it was possible to achieve a partial unification of the
law by royal legislation. Colbert, the minister of Louis XIV
(1667-1670) projected a code, and a beginning was made
in a succession of royal ordinances regulating particular por-
tions of the law for the whole kingdom. There were two
further attempts under Louis XV. But it was not till after
the Revolution that the local opposition to unification of
the law was overcome.
(b) The eighteenth-century codes. Codification in Prus-
sia began under the auspices of Frederick the Great. It
was done under the influence of the theory of natural law;
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the idea that by a pure train of reasoning a complete and
perfect code could be worked out which would be of uni-
versal application and would meet the demands of justice
in every case. Under the influence of this theory that uni-
versal principles of universal validity were discoverable by
reason and could be developed by logic into a complete sys-
tem of universal rules, juristic theory of the eighteenth cen-
tury looked forward to a complete and perfect code as the
goal of all juristic study. Frederick the Great was strongly
impressed with this theory and required his chancellor to
draw up a code for Prussia. A draft of the first part of this
code was published in 1749 as a draft of the "Corpus Iurs
Fredericiani." But it was not completed and was not en-
acted. In 1780, the King ordered a new code. This was
completed after his death and was put in force in 1794 as
the "Allgemeines Landrecht fur die Preussischen Stawten."
It remained in force in Prussia until the taking effect of the
German Civil Code in 1900.
An Austrian code was projected by the Empress Maria
Theresa as far back as 1713. She appointed a commission
to draw up a code. A draft was completed in 1767 but was
rejected. A second draft was prepared and a part of it, the
law of persons, was put in force in 1787. The whole code,
Allgemeines burgerliches Gesetzbuch, was put in force in
1811. It was an independent piece of legislation, not a
copy of anything.
(c) The French Civil Code and its progeny. In the
course of the French Revolution the movement to unify the
law revived. The Convention planned a code and ordered
its legislative committee to present a draft within a month.
Accordingly, in August, 1793, Cambaceres in the name of
the committee reported a draft civil code of 695 articles.
But the Convention was suspicious of the Roman law and
of the droit coutumier and found the draft not revolutionary
enough. It was felt that attempt should be made to realize
a philosophical idea of simple democratic laws accessible to
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all citizens. The draft was rejected and it was voted to
appoint a committee of philosophers to draw up a new draft.
Political events prevented carrying out of this idea. In
1794, after the fall of Robespierre, Cambaceres brought for-
ward a second draft even shorter and more laconic than the
first (297 articles). Some parts were adopted, but nothing
further was done. Under the Directory in 1796, Cambaceres
brought forward a third draft which, however, was not
considered.
In 1800, Napoleon, as First Consul, took the matter up
with characteristic vigor and determination, appointing a
commissiin of four to draw up a draft. They divided the
work, charging each with the drawing up of a part, and
handed in a draft in four months. It was submitted to the
Court of Cassation and to the Courts of Appeal, which made
useful suggestions. The legislative organization in 1800
was very complicated, consisting of a Council of State, a
Tribunate, a Legislative Body, and a Senate. In the
Tribunate there were many representatives of the Revolu-
tion who systematically opposed all projects of the First
Consul. They insisted that the proposed code was only a
servile copy of the Roman law and the old droit coutumier,
and as a result of their opposition the Legislative Body re-
jected the first title and was about to reject the second when
a message from the First Consul withdrew the draft. Na-
poleon then by a coup d'6tat reformed the Tribunate, re-
ducing it to 50 members of his own liking, and then resub-
mitted the draft to the Council of State. Through the pres-
sure of the government it was adopted in 36 statutes succes-
sively enacted after March, 1803, and these were then united
in the Code Civile des Francais in March, 1804. As finally
enacted it was composed of 2281 articles.
An express provision in the statute which put the Code
in force abrogated, as to all matters dealt with by the Code,
the Roman law, the ordinances, the general and local cus-
toms, the statutes, and the regulations which had had the
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force of law. But it is held that as to any matter of private
law not treated of in the Code, resort may be made to the
pre-existing law if there is no subsequent legislation on the
point. It should be added that much subsequent legislation
has modified, added to, or supplemented, and in places
abrogated particular articles or parts of them, so that the
Code as it stands is by no means wholly what it was in 1804.
The French Civil Code was adopted or copied with minor
changes in Latin countries, European and American, and in
Holland. Thus we have, as it were, a great family of codes
derived from the Code Napoleon.
(d) The German Civil Code and twentieth-century codes.
In the meantime a reaction against legislation set in along
with giving up of the eighteenth-century natural law and the
influence of the historical school, which was skeptical as to
the efficacy of lawmaking and thoroughly disbelieved in
codification. There were a number of projects for codes in
the German states, largely in connection with or influenced
by the liberal movement of 1848. But general interest in
codification did not revive until the last quarter of the
nineteenth century, when the legislative activity of the
German Empire led to a succession of new codes. In the
wake of the Burgerliches Gesetzbuch (Civil Code) completed
in 1896 and in effect in 1900, there came the Japanese Civil
Code (completed and in effect in 1898), the Swiss federal
codes (Code of Obligations, 1901, Civil Code, 1907, took
effect in 1912), the Civil Code of Brazil (1917, 1919), and
the Chinese Civil Code (1930).
In the preparation of the German Civil Code the first
commission was appointed in 1874. It consisted of six
judges, three practicing lawyers, and two professors of law.
They divided the work into five parts and in 1880 each sec-
tion had its draft. From 1880 to 1887 they all went over
the whole and the draft code was complete in 1887. Then
the draft was published and general criticism was invited.
The whole and every part was subjected to searching criti-
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cism by everybody - lawyers, publicists, business men,
clergymen, and labor leaders. At the end of three years the
government brought all the controversial literature together,
published it, and in 1890 appointed a new commission of
eight judges, two practicing lawyers, and one professor, to
draw up the code de novo with the first draft and the criti-
cisms for a guide. It took six years to finish the final draft.
It was published in 1896 and after much discussion was en-
acted and took effect in 1900. It was the result of twenty-
three years of thorough work. No other legislation has ever
been done so thoroughly and carefully.
When a code was projected for the Japanese Empire, a
question arose whether it should be English, French, or
German in its lines. One American, one English, one French,
and one German professor of law was appointed to teach
the respective systems at Tokyo. For a time it appeared
that the French law would prevail. Professor Boissonade
was appointed to draw up a draft code and drew up a
modernized Code Napoleon. But before it was to go into
effect pressure led to appointment in 1893 of a Code In-
vestigation Committee or Committee of Revision. This
Committee, instead of merely revising Boissonade's draft,
drew what is in effect a new one chiefly along German lines.
It was the product of four Japanese professors of law at
Tokyo. This draft was promulgated in parts successively
between 1896 and 1898. It is noteworthy that the head of
this Committee got his legal education at the Inns of Court.
He was a barrister of the Middle Temple. German modern
Roman law, however, lent itself to a code better than Eng-
lish law. In such a competition the Anglo-American law is
at its worst. The strong point of English law is not in
legislation.
Among recent codes the Swiss Civil Code is especially
noteworthy. It is the work of Eugen Huber, Professor of
Swiss Private Law at Basel and afterwards at Bern, who
when he was commissioned (1892) to draw up a federal
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civil code had become the recognized authority upon the law
which was to be codified. His draft was published in 1900
and a commission of 31 was appointed to examine it.
Criticism by the public was solicited and the material re-
sulting was collected and submitted to the commission along
with a discussion by Professor Huber of the motives and
reasons behind the several provisions. After this commission
had reported an editing commission of seven, of which Pro-
fessor Huber was a member, put the draft in final form in
which it was submitted to the Federal Assembly in 1904.
It was discussed before the National Council and the Coun-
cil of the States from 1905 to 1907 and adopted in December,
1907, to take effect January 1, 1912. Thus there was noth-
ing hurried in the preparation or adoption of this code.
In Russia under the old regime there was a compilation
of legislation only. There had been a number of commis-
sions for codification of the laws in force but their work had
been interrupted and broken off when Nicholas I in 1826
ordered it proceeded with. The result was a compilation of
the legislation on private law from 1649 to 1832 promulgated
in 1833 to take effect in 1835. It was called the code of
statutes of the Russian Empire. At the outbreak of the first
world war a project for a civil code was pending, but noth-
ing came of it because of the revolution. Under the Soviet
regime codification has gone forward.
5. Conditions which have led to codification. Some com-
mon features in the circumstances which led to codification
should be noted. In Justinian's time (1) juristic develop-
ment of the law had come substantially to an end; the pos-
sibilities of further juristic development of the traditional
element were exhausted. (2) The authoritative legal ma-
terials were unwieldly in bulk involving great labor in find-
ing what the law was. (3) The law was full of more or less
obsolete rules depending only upon history and fitting in ill
with the more modern parts of the system. For example,
there was legal title and equitable title; there were two
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orders of succession - there was legal heir and equitable
heir. (4) Many fundamental questions which had been de-
bated by jurists for centuries remained unsettled. (5) A
period of legislation had been in progress for more than a
century and the growing point of the law had shifted com-
pletely to legislation. Legislation had become the ordinary
form of lawmaking.
When Napoleon's code was adopted, (1) again juristic
development of the purely Roman materials and of French
customary (Germanic) law had substantially come to an
end. Pothier had for the time being exhausted the pos-
sibilities of purely juristic development of the traditional
materials. (2) The law was very unwieldy in bulk and un-
certain in form: (a) The modem Roman law; (b) French
exposition and commentary; (c) French customary law and
exposition and commentary; (d) French legislation; (e)
French judicial decision so far as it had brought about a
usus fori. (3) Again the law was full of obsolete rules of a
historical character, some Roman and some Germanic. (4)
Many fundamental questions which had been debated upon
the basis of the Roman texts since the revived study of the
Roman law in the twelfth century still remained open. (5)
A period of legislation had been in progress for one hundred
years; since the ordinances of Louis XIV in which he began
to make royal legislation the ordinary agency of legal growth.
The growing point of French law had definitely shifted to
legislation. One more point must be added. There was
imperative need of a unified law. The old provinces had
each to a great extent its own law. The customary law (the
Germanic element) differed much with each locality. The
abolition of the old provinces at the Revolution and thorough
political unification of France demanded a -legal unification.
There had to be one law of France.
In the same way when the German code was adopted,
(1) the German jurists of the historical school had so
thoroughly worked out the possibilities of purely juristic
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
development of the Roman texts and the Germanists had
so completely worked out the juristic possibilities of what
there was of Germanic law that a new start, a new basis
for future juristic development was imperative. (2) The
law was unwieldy in bulk and uncertain in form. It was
made up of: (a) The Corpus luris Civilis; (b) the academic
development of the Corpus Iuris from the twelfth to the
sixteenth century; (c) the usus modernus, that is, German
juristic exposition of the modern Roman law on the basis
of the practice of the courts; (d) Germanic law (customary)
and juristic exposition of it; (e) local codes and legislation;
(f) usus fori, the settled course of decision on certain points.
(3) Many historical rules and traditional doctrines were
wholly out of touch with the modern world, e.g. the contract
theory of agency. (4) Many fundamental questions, e.g.
the will theory or the declaration theory of a legal transac-
tion, remained open and controverted. (5) The growing
point had definitely shifted to legislation and an efficient
organ of legislative lawmaking was at hand in the empire.
Morever, here again there was an imperative need of a uni-
fied law. Each of the old states had its own legislation and
more or less its own law. The modern Roman law, which
was called gemeines Recht (the common law of Germany)
was a bond more or less feebly uniting these diverse bodies
of law just as our common law more or less holds together
forty-eight diverse bodies of state law.
A like condition was behind codification in Switzerland.
It will be noticed that two classes of countries adopted
codes: (1) Those with well developed systems which had
exhausted the possibilities of juristic development through
the traditional element and so needed a new basis for further
juristic development - Justinian's empire, revolutionary
France, Austria at the end of the eighteenth century, the
German Empire after 1871, are in this class; (2) those that
had their whole legal development ahead of them and needed
an immediate basis for development. Japan is a conspicuous
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example. But the Latin-American republics are in this
class also. They started from adaptations of the French
Civil Code as we started from the seventeenth-century Eng-
lish law.
Another point is significant. In the case of each original
code there was a strong organ of legislation which could in-
sure adequate preliminary study and resist the pressure of
those who were not competent to the work. Justinian,
Napoleon, the German Empire, the Japanese Empire en-
gaged the best legal and juristic talent that could be had.
Also the German Empire gave the commissioners ample time.
It would seem, then, if historical experience is to be re-
lied on, that codes are demanded where (1) the traditional
element of the law for the time being has become sterile; its
possibilities are substantially exhausted, so that a new basis
is required for a juristic new start; or, instead, a basis is
required on which to build a body of law for a country with
no juristic past. (2) The law is unwieldy, full of archaisms,
and uncertain. (3) The growing point has shifted to legis-
lation and an efficient organ of legislation has developed.
(4) There is need of one law in a political community whose
several subdivisions have developed divergent local systems.
The fourth is not essential, as Justinian's legislation shows.
But it played a great part in bringing about the French and
German and Swiss codes.
CODIFICATION IN ANGLo-AMERICAN LAW. 1. Bacon's
plan. A proposal to codify the common law was made by
Francis Bacon, then Attorney General, in 1614. It is in-
titled "A Proposition to His Majesty by Sir Francis Bacon,
Knight, His Majesty's Attorney General, and one of his
Privy Council, Touching the Compiling and Amendment of
the Laws of England." His plan, as he stated it, con-
templated: (1) An institutional part to be made up of (a)
a Book of Institutes, (b) A Treatise on Maxims, (c) Terms
of the Law (i.e. an authoritative law dictionary); (2) a new
edition of the Year Books, abridging the reports of the cases,
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leaving out repetitions and queries, and collecting an-
tinomies, which were then to be settled by the opinion of
the judges in the Exchequer Chamber or in Parliament; (3)
a compilation of statute law, cutting out the obsolete, re-
pealing what was dormant, and "snaring," mitigating the
old severe penalties which had come down from the Middle
Ages, and reducing "concurrent" statutes to "one clear, uni-
form law." Pursuant to this proposal among four bills pro-
posed by Bacon at the instance of the Crown in 1614, the
second was "An Act giving authority to certain commission-
ers to review the state of penal laws to the end that such
as are obsolete and snaring may be repealed and such as
are fit to continue and concern one matter may be reduced
respectively to one clear form of law." This contemplated
a compilation of penal legislation. The project submitted
to the King contemplated codification on the lines of Jus-
tinian's Institutes, Digest, and Code. Owing to political
controversies this Parliament was dissolved. Bacon there-
upon persuaded the King to take the matter up by royal
commission. Accordingly, in 1620 a report was made of what
had been done "by direction from the King and the lords of
the council upon the advice of the now Lord Chancellor."
Bacon was then chancellor. Seven lawyers, including Sir
Edward Coke, Noy (afterwards Attorney General to Charles
I), and Finch, who were the commissioners appointed by
the King, were to "survey all the statutes and draw all the
statutes concerning one matter into one plain and perfect
law, and consider which were fit to be repealed, which en-
forced, and which fit to be continued." The report set forth
that the commission had found almost six hundred statutes
fit to be repealed. Accordingly, a select committee was ap-
pointed to report on the subject, but owing to political con-
troversies nothing came of it. On Bacon's retirement the
first item in the program of work which he laid out for him-
self was the recompiling of the laws, and afterward in a
letter to the King he offered to undertake the making of a
digest of the laws of England. Nothing came of this.
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2. The Anglo-Indian Codes (1837-1886). A next essay
at codification was brought about by the conditions of ad-
ministration of English law in India. The first of the Anglo-
Indian codes was a penal code drawn up by a commission
of which Lord Macauley was a member. It was presented
to the Governor General in 1837, but did not become a law
until 1860. Holland said of it that it was the most scien-
tific piece of legislation in the English language. Lord Bryce
after a pretty full inquiry in India, reported that in 1899
it was regarded by Indian practitioners as eminently satis-
factory. A code of civil procedure was enacted in 1859 and
a code of penal procedure in 1861. As far back as 1840
agitation began in India for a code of substantive law and a
commission was appointed, of which Sir John Romilly and
Lord Chief Justice Jervis were members, which in 1855
reported that such a code was required by conditions there.
Accordingly, a commission was set up, of which Sir John
Romilly, Sir William Erle, and Sir John Shaw Willes were
among the members, which in 1863 reported a Succession
Act codifying the law of successions except for Hindus,
Mohammedans and Buddhists. A further installment, known
as the Contract Act, was reported in 1866 and adopted.
Since that time the larger part of the English law in force
in India has been codified. Except for the penal code the
statutes are not well done. They follow too much the Field
draft code.
3. The New York Code. Agitation for codification in
New York was in part a phase of the legislative reform
movement of the fore part of the nineteenth century and
influenced by the wide attention given to the writings of
Bentham. In part it grew out of the hostility toward Eng-
lish institutions and English law in the period after the
Revolution and favor toward things French which went
along with-Jeffersonian democracy. Both were well marked
in New York. The French civil code had fascinated many,
as it had almost every one abroad. Lay discussions of
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American law in the first quarter of the nineteenth century
abound in demands for an American code. Very likely the
connection of Livingston with the code in Louisiana was an
influence also. But the prime mover was David Dudley
Field. Before the New York Constitutional Convention in
1846, he had urged a general code. Largely as a result of
his agitation, the constitution in 1847 provided for com-
missioners to reform procedure and codify the law. The
commission to reform procedure was appointed in 1847 and
in 1848 reported the first installment of the code of civil
procedure, which was enacted in April of that year and put
in effect in July. The rest of the code was reported from
time to time in four different reports until in 1850 complete
codes of civil and criminal procedure were submitted to the
legislature. The history of the code of civil procedure is
well known. Either substantially as reported by Field's
commission or in the form 'of codes based upon his draft,
it came to be in force in about thirty jurisdictions. After
the adoption of the code of civil procedure the enthusiasm
for law reform in New York waned, and in 1850 the legis-
lature repealed the act appointing a commission to reform
procedure and codify the law. One reason seems to have
been that the commission on codifying the substantive law,
which was headed by Chancellor Walworth, had proceeded
with a deliberation which was not satisfactory to the public.
Upon this Field renewed his agitation for codification
of the common law, and in 1857 the legislature provided for
a new commission "to reduce into a written and systematic
code the whole body of the law of this state or so much
and such parts thereof as shall seem to them practical and
expedient." The commissioners were David Dudley Field,
William Curtis Noyes, and Alexander W. Bradford; obvious-
ly too small a commission for such a purpose. Noyes under-
took the penal code and Field the political and civil codes.
In preparing the civil code Field was assisted by Thomas
G. Shearman and Austin Abbott, both well known as text
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writers. This commission put forth the first draft of a civil
code in 1862. The draft of the penal code, which had been
assigned to Noyes, was presented in 1864. The political
code was reported by Field in 1860.
In 1865, after Field had been at work upon these codes
for eighteen years, the full text of the five codes, namely,
the code of civil procedure, the code of criminal procedure,
the penal code, the civil code, and the political code, were
submitted in the ninth and last report of the commission.
Of the eighteen years in which Field devoted a large part
of his time to these codes, he received no compensation ex-
cept for the first two years.
The original code of civil procedure adopted in New
York was Field's first draft. His final draft was not adopted,
but a different one, prepared on a different plan, although
founded on Field's code, was adopted between 1876 and
1880. This code, which was prepared by Throop, went into
great detail. Whereas there were 392 sections in Field's
original code, in Throop's version this was extended to 3356,
and further additions in 1890 and 1897 made the whole
number of sections 3441. A great deal of the deservedly
severe criticism which has been directed against the New
York Code of Civil Procedure applies rather to this attempt
to regulate by precise rule every action of the judge from
the time he enters the court room than to the original Field
draft. The Civil Practice Act of 1920 reduced this to 1540
sections (still too much detail) and further simplification
has been going on.
In 1881, the code of criminal procedure was enacted, but
the other codes failed of adoption in New York. As has
been said above, some thirty jurisdictions adopted the code
of civil procedure. Sixteen jurisdictions adopted the penal
code and the code of criminal procedure. California, Mon-
tana, and North and South Dakota adopted all five of
Field's codes. California, North Dakota and South Dakota
have in addition a code of probate law. But it should be
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said in this connection that the civil code has accomplished
little in the four jurisdictions which adopted it. The courts,
especially in California, frequently ignored the civil code,
deciding questions as matters of common law, seldom refe-
ring to the code or, if they did, assuming that it was merely
declaratory. This attitude of the courts, however, was not
the sole cause of the comparative failure of Field's civil
code. It must be admitted that the code was by no means
well drawn. The work was too much for one man, even
though as good a lawyer and tireless a worker as David
Dudley Field. It was fortunate both for the substantive law
of New York and for the cause of codification that that
state did not adopt his draft.
4. The Movement for Codification in Massachusetts.
Along with the movement for codification in New York there
was for a time a like movement in Massachusetts. In 1835,
the Massachusetts legislature provided for the appointment
of commissioners "to take into consideration the practicality
and expediency of reducing to a written and systematic code
the common law of Massachusetts or any part thereof, and
report to the next legislature, subjoining to their report a
plan or plans of the best method in which such reduction
can be accomplished." The commission appointed consisted
of Joseph Story, Theron Metcalf, Simon Greenleaf, Charles
E. Forbes, and Luther S. Cushing. It reported in December,
1836, on the whole distinctly in favor of codification. Its
report, which was reprinted in 1882, in connection with one
of Bentham's letters to the people of the United States with
respect to codification, is one of the classical authorities
on the subject. This movement for codification in Massa-
chusetts was during the full tide of the legislative reform
movement, and interest in the subject seems to have waned
quickly. Judge Story's books soon supplied the need which
had been behind the agitation for codification.
5. The Civil Code of Georgia (1860). In Georgia in
1858 an act of the legislature provided for the election of
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three commissioners to "prepare for the people of Georgia
a Code, which should, as near as practicable, embrace, in a
condensed form, the laws of Georgia, whether derived from
the common law, the Constitutions, the Statutes of the
State, the Decisions of the Supreme Court, or the Statutes
of England in force in this State." Three commissioners
accordingly were elected. They prepared a code divided
into four parts, namely: First part, the political and public
organization of the State; Second part, the civil code; Third
part, the code of practice; Fourth part, penal laws. For
the most part this was simply a revision and compilation of
the statute law of the state. But the part known as the
civil code, consisting of 1586 sections, is made up of extracts
from the ordinary text books of the common law in use in
this country at that time. The best that can be said for
this is that it furnished an authoritative text book of the
common law at a time when there were few extensive
libraries in the state and few law books at hand in many
rural court houses and many questions remained unanswered
in the local reports.
It should be added that the code was prepared in about
a year, was reported in 1860, and was adopted in that year
to take effect in 1862. It goes without saying that codifica-
tion of the common law by three commissioners in one year
is a wholly impossible undertaking. The code has had little
effect. For the most part the courts treat it as declaratory
and usually go on the common law.
6. Lord Westbury's plan. In 1860, Lord Westbury, then
Sir Richard Bethell and Attorney General, announced in
Parliament a plan of the government which he represented
for a revision and compilation of the statute law of England.
In 1863, when he had become chancellor, in a speech in the
House of Lords, he proposed that in addition to the revision
of statute law then in progress, a digest should be made of
the reported cases with a view to an ultimate combination
of statutes and cases alike in a digest and finally in a code
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of the whole English law. In 1866, a royal commission was
set up, the members of which were, among others, Lord
Cranworth, Lord Westbury, Lord Cairns, Vice Chancellor
Wood (afterward Lord Hatherley) Sir Roundell Palmer
(afterward Lord Selborne) and Mr. Thring (afterward Lord
Thring and Parliamentary Counsel), which was to "inquire
into the expediency of a digest of law, and the best means
of accomplishing that object and of otherwise exhibiting
in a compendious and accessible form the law as embodied
in judicial decisions." The first report of this commission in
1867 endorsed the idea of codification and recommended
that the commission be authorized to superintend the prep-
aration of a portion of the proposed -digest as an example
of what might be done. I have already referred to some of
the results of the work of this commission in what finally
took the form of text books on branches of the common law.
Nothing else came of this project. The movement for
reorganization of the courts and reform of procedure which
culminated in the Judicature Act (1873) directed the
energies of law reformers in a different direction.
7. The project in Victoria (1879-1888). In Victoria, in
1879, there was a bill "to declare, consolidate, and amend
the general substantive law relating to certain duties of the
people." It covered the greater part of the substantive law
except as to property. It got no further than a second read-
ing. In 1880, the bill was revised and completed and passed
by the Legislative Council but was not considered by the
Legislative Assembly. In 1881, a part covering obligations
was introduced in the Legislative Council but was not pro-
ceeded with. But Parliament made an appropriation for
the expense of revision and a Draft Code of the General
Substantive Law of Victoria was prepared. In 1882, this
draft was turned over to a committee of eight barristers for
revision. It was in complete form in 1885 and was sub-
mitted to the Legislative Council. It was not enacted, but
in 1888 it was reintroduced as "The General Code, 1888."
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Nothing further was done. The draft, containing in all
3244 sections, was the work of W. E. Hearn, a writer on
economics, jurisprudence, and politics.
8. Gradual codification. Perhaps the pioneer bit of
partial codification in the formative era of American law is
the New York Real Property Law of 1828, revised in 1896.
It was a better job than judicial construction and applica-
tion have made it appear. American law was not far enough
along in its development in the first third of the nineteenth
century to make such an act achieve its purposes. More-
over, common-law lawyers are not at their best in develop-
ing legislative texts. They seem bound to treat them as
declaratory or else to ignore them. But codification of par-
ticular branches of the common law as distinguished from
reforming legislation is a phenomenon of the last decades
of the century and of the present century. After the adop-
tion of the Judicature Act the need of putting commercial
law in England into a more certain form led to three statutes
in which portions of the Law were codified. These are the
Bills of Exchange Act of 1882, codifying the law of negoti-
able instruments, the Partnership Act of 1890, and the Sale
of Goods Act of 1893, codifying the law of sales. This sort
of codification, legislative restatement of particular fields
of the law has been going forward in Great Britain, for ex-
ample, the English Law of Property Act, 1922, a reform-
ing codification, and the Administration of Estates Act, 1925.
Agitation in the United States for uniform commercial
law was stimulated by the example of the English Bills of
Exchange Act. As a result of this, at the instance of the
American Bar Association, an annual Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws was organized. It is
composed of commissioners appointed by the Governors of
the several states and meets in connection with the annual
meetings of the American Bar Association. It had its in-
ception in a special committee of that Association on Uni-
form State Laws, appointed in 1889. In 1895, the com-
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missioners appointed a committee to draw a draft of an act
codifying the law of negotiable instruments, to be submitted
at the annual meeting in 1896. This draft, drawn in a year,
was agreed upon, and with some changes of detail in some
of the states, has been adopted in fifty-one jurisdictions. In
1901, the commissioners authorized draft of a law to make
uniform the law of sales. This was drawn up much more
carefully. The first draft was prepared by Professor Willis-
ton in 1902 and 1903, was printed in 1903, and was dis-
tributed to teachers of law, text writers, and practicing
lawyers with a request for criticism. In the light of criti-
cisms submitted a revised draft was drawn up and presented
to the commissioners in 1904. This was gone over section
by section at the conference in 1904. A second revised draft
was presented and considered in 1905, and then a final dra.ft
in 1906, which was adopted by the commissioners. This
draft was enacted by some twenty-seven jurisdictions. It
is the first thoroughgoing bit of codification in the United
States. None of the drafts prior to this had been drawn
with the thoroughness and care that characterize this act.
The important codifying acts drafted by the Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws are: The Negotiable Instruments
Law (1896), Sales Act (1906), Warehouse Receipts Act
(1906), Stock Transfer Act (1909), Bills of Lading Act
(1909), Partnership Act (1914), and Conditional Sales
Act (1918).
9. "Private Codification?' - i.e. private texts in code
form and private restatements which put the law in form
for codification. Following the example of books which
represented drafts prepared for the commissioners under
Lord Westbury's plan, it became common in England at one
time to put text books of the law in the form of codes. In
addition to the books noted in another connection Dicey,
Rules for the Selection of the Parties to an Action (1870),
Dicey, Law of Domicil as a Branch of the Law of England
stated in the form of rules (1879), Dicey, Digest of the
SOURCES AND FORMS OF LAW
Law of England with reference to the Conflict of Laws
(1896), Bower, Code of Actionable Defamation with a
Continuous Commentary (1908), and Bower, The Law of
Actionable Misrepresentation Stated in the Form of a Code,
followed by a Commentary (1911), may be referred to. We
have a book of this sort in the United States in Wigmore,
Pocket Code of Evidence (2 ed). Such books could well
prepare the way for an ultimate codification. In this con-
nection the work of the American Law Institute in restating
the law is specially significant. This private restatement,
which is being widely followed by the courts, might well
pave the way for a code.
POSSIBILITIES AND ADVISABILITY OF A CIvIL CODE. 1.
Purposes of codification. Three different ideas of a code
have been urged. The first, which may be called the Bentha-
mite idea, is really the idea of the eighteenth-century law
of nature school. It regards a code as a complete legislative
statement of the whole body of the law so as to put it au-
thoritatively in one self-sufficing form.
A second view, at the other extreme, is that which was
adopted by a number of the commissioners under Lord West-
bury's plan and has been urged particularly by Holland and
by Sir James Stephen. According to this idea, orderly ar-
rangement, convenience of ascertainment, and publicity are
the chief objects; so that preparation of a code involves
(a) republication in systematic form of the whole mass of
existing law of every kind, and (b) separate codification of
statute and common law, adhering as closely as possible to
the language, conceptions, and methods of the old law.
A third view, which was the one taken, on the whole, by
the framers of the French Civil Code and by those who
framed the German code, is that the purpose must be pri-
marily to provide so far as possible a complete legislative
statement of principles so as to furnish a legislative basis
for juristic and judicial development along modern lines;
laying down rules sparingly and for the analogies they fur-
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nish, except in the law of property and of inheritance where
precise rules are called for.
Bentham and Austin following him conceived that it
would be possible not only to make the law certain and ac-
cessible but to remove all ground for dispute as to the mean-
ing of terms or interpretation of the code provisions. In
other words, they conceived that the function of the judge
could be limited to the application to concrete cases of rules
so clearly formulated that nothing more than genuine in-
terpretation would be necessary except for new and un-
foreseeable situations of fact. The notion that something
of this sort can be done has been widespread but is refuted
by all juristic and judicial experience. In Frederick the
Great's Code the lawmaker's intention was to formulate with
such careful minuteness that no possible doubt could arise in
the future. Hence it was provided that the judges were not
to have any discretion as to interpretation but were to con-
sult a royal commission on any points they found doubtful
and were to be absolutely bound by the answer of this com-
mission. This stereotyping of the law was in accordance
with the doctrine of the law of nature school which believed
that a perfect and complete system could be worked out
for which no changes would ever become necessary. Thus
rational propositions could be laid down once for all so as
to be available for every possible combination of circum-
stances. Perhaps it need not be said that the attempt to
realize such an ideal proved impossible. After a time the
royal commission was abolished and the right and duty of
judges to interpret and develop by analogy had to be
recognized.
Conceding that the first idea is impracticable, the second
plan seems not worth while. Sir James Stephen's idea was
that it would furnish a prelude to an eventual code in which
the results of the development of the imperative element
and of the traditional element were to be combined as was
proposed by Lord Westbury. Justinian's codification shows
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us that a parallel compilation of the legislature-made and
digest of judge-made law are likely to come into conflict
not merely by overlapping of precepts but because the pre-
supposition of a precept in the one way may not be that of a
precept on the same point in the other. In this respect the
codifier of Anglo-American law will encounter a difficulty in
the distinction of our substantive law into law and equity.
It would be much greater if he started with a compilation
of statutes and a digest of decided cases. He would have
much more to do than be sure to choose between all con-
flicting precepts. He would need to be sure that precepts
presupposing divergent starting points for reasoning were
not in his code side by side.
Those who drew up the French civil code made the first
attempt to put the third idea into operation. In that code,
on the whole, the attempt was made not to lay down minute
rules on every conceivable point but to formulate broad
principles. Of course this may be carried too far. On cer-
tain points and in certain fields of the law definite rules are
expedient or even necessary. But in general, as has been
seen in other connections, the lawmaker, whether legislative
or judicial, must not be over-ambitious to lay down universal
rules. Property and succession require many rules. Torts
admit of relatively few. Sometimes in the law of property,
as in case of what the civilians call specification, a rule is
necessary yet no rule has been found wholly satisfactory.
In the German code and the codes since 1900 this idea has
been carried out consistently. The aim has been to formu-
late the principles which have been worked out by juristic
or judicial or legislative experience, to develop them ana-
lytically, and to set forth as clearly as possible a body of
principles representing the highest development of the law
in modem times, rather than a complete body of rules, while
at the same time laying down carefully formulated rules
where, as in property and succession, rules are required.
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2. Objections to codification. Many Anglo-American
lawyers have insisted that codification of the common law
would be, if not impossible, at least highly unfortunate. Al-
most everything which has been written in English in op-
position to codification has its basis directly or indirectly in
Savigny's tract on the Vocation of our Age for Legislation
and Jurisprudence. Savigny's objections to codification
were answered by Austin. But the weight of Austin's argu-
ments is somewhat impaired by his acceptance of Bentham's
idea of a code.
Savigny's objections resolve themselves to three. First,
he argues that the growth of the law is likely to be impeded
or diverted into unnatural directions. Experience, however,
shows that this is not necessarily true. It can hardly be
doubted that, on the whole, the French code brought about
a juristic new start which has favored the development of
the law in France. No doubt an ill drawn or too hastily
drawn code might afford so poor a basis for further juristic
or judicial development as to impede the progress of a sys-
tem of law. There is no reason to suppose, however, that
the carefully drawn codes of the present century have had
any such effect.
Savigny's second objection is that a code made by one
generation is likely to project directly or indirectly the in-
tellectual and moral notions which existed at that time into
days when such notions have become anachronisms. There
is undoubted truth in this and it might well result from a
code made on the basis of such a digest as was contemplated
by Holland and by Sir James Stephen. But it must be
observed that development of the law through juristic work-
ing over of the traditional element is open to the same ob-
jection. Our common law today can show more than one
example of projection into the present of the ideas and modes
of thought of the past. The law of the last part of the
nineteenth century was full of such cases.
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Savigny's third objection is based upon defects in the
codes of the past. They may be summed up in two. (a)
The codifiers but too often had only superficial knowledge
of the law they tried to codify. Partly this was due to the
eighteenth-century notion of natural law which made men
think they could make a wholly new system by pure reason
without regard to the juristic or judicial experience of the
past. Partly it has been due to the attempt of one person
or of a small number of persons to codify the whole law.
The law of a modern state is too complex to be so thorough-
ly mastered in all its parts by one man or a few men as to
enable that man or those few men to draw up a code. (b)
In most cases codes in the past have been drawn too hurried-
ly. Justinian's commissioners set a bad precedent in that
matter which was followed unhappily by those who drew
the French civil code. The French code, the Georgia code,
and the Negotiable Instruments Law in the United States
are examples of the defects which necessarily result from
undue haste. Field's civil code is an example of the defects
which are sure to result from the attempt of one man to
cover the whole field. The German code shows what may
be accomplished by a sufficiently large commission taking
sufficient time for its work and utilizing full criticism from
every side.
To the points which Savigny made against the codes of
the past, Austin added two others which are noteworthy.
(1) He objected to them because they made no adequate pro-
vision for the incorporation from time to time of judicial
interpretation. He insisted that there should be some pro-
vision whereby periodically the results of judicial applica-
tion or interpretation of the code should be incorporated
therein and in that way the traditional element which grows
up around a code be made part of it. (2) He objected
especially to the French code because it was not complete
and was intended to be eked out by the pre-existing law.
This is based largely on his idea that a code can be made
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substantially self-sufficing. It is probably impossible to
draw up a code in such a way that all reference to the pre-
existing law to throw light upon it will be oviated. It is
true that so far as possible this necessity of looking into
the law before the code should be done away with since
otherwise a tendency will arise to treat the code sections as
only declaratory. Herein is one of the chief defects of Field's
civil code. It assumed at every point a pretty thorough
knowledge of the common law, and was not in itself so clear
and sound as to be any real help toward ascertaining the
pre-existing law. On the other hand, the attempt to fore-
close all judicial or juristic working over of the material of
the code must in view of the experience of the past be pro-
nounced futile. The most serious objection to a code in a
common-law jurisdiction is that we have no well developed
common-law technique of developing legislative texts. Our
technique of statutory interpretation is not adequate to
the application of a code.
3. Advisability of codifying Anglo-American law. If we
apply to common-law jurisdictions what experience has
shown as to the conditions which lead to codes, it must be
evident that, especially in America, we are rapidly approach-
ing a condition in which codification is likely to be re-
sorted to.
(1) It can hardly be questioned that our case law is by
no means able to rise to new situations as it could do in the
past. Practically it broke down on the important subject
of employer's liability and workmen's compensation. There
was clear failure in holding promoters to their duties. De-
velopment was too slow in the law of public service agencies
and conspicuously too slow in labor law. In these fields
legislation and administrative commissions and boards have
replaced common law and adjudication. Even in legal pro-
cedure it took legislation in England, Canada, and Australia
to provide a modern system, although judicial rule-making
has done the most for that subject in the present century.
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It must be admitted that the traditional element has shown
signs for a time of having exhausted its possibilities.
(2) The defects of form in Anglo-American law of today
are obvious. They may be summed up as five. (a) Want
of certainty. This is very marked in jurisdictions in which
questions which have been passed upon in other jurisdictions
are still open. There is no certain assurance that the solu-
tion which has been adopted elsewhere will be followed.
Moreover, it often happens that different solutions have been
reached in other jurisdictions so that on many questions
there are a number of competing rules of persuasive au-
thority from which to choose, with respect to which the law
is still open in some of our most important states. All sorts
of trivial questions receive elaborate answers in the books
while great and fundamental ones remain in a provoking
state of uncertainty because lawyers advise clients to settle
rather than pursue a doubtful litigation. Statutory changes
are piecemeal and haphazard and the law has to be settled
in each jurisdiction as to each controverted point by an ela-
borate system of judicial opinions which detracts much from
thorough judicial consideration of individual cases.
(b) Waste of labor entailed by the unwieldy form of
the law. As Chief Justice Sharswood put the matter, the
difficulty is not so much to know the law as to know where
to find it. Undoubtedly in the long run it is a good thing
for the science of law to leave rules and principles to be
worked out, in the language of Mr. Justice Miller, by a pro-
cess of judicial inclusion and exclusion. But the process
is hard on the community and the law and takes time away
from thorough consideration of cases. Our appellate courts
have often to put in so much time in finding the law that
they cannot always give adequate consideration to the case.
In 1885, a committee of the American Bar Association found
that in one volume of New York Reports, in 79 decisions
reported, the judges cited 449 cases or between five and six
to each, of which 353 were from New York, 56 from Eng-
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land, and the rest from 16 different states. But these 449
cases cited by the court were taken from 5300 cited in the
briefs of counsel. In other words, a conscientious court was
expected to look at 5300 reported decisions in order to de-
cide 79 cases. From personal experience I can testify that
the labor is very heavy. The judges in important appellate
courts today must have law secretaries to enable them to
reduce this task to reasonable proportions.
(c) Lack of knowledge of the law on the part of those
who amend it. It must be admitted that the fault in our
sometimes crude legislation on matters of private law is not
all with the legislators. It is sometimes an almost impossible
task in jurisdictions where many controverted questions,
often fundamental, are still open, to ascertain with assur-
ance what the law is which is to be changed or amended
or abrogated.
(d) Irrationality, due to partial survival of obsolete pre-
cepts. In Illinois in 1910, the Supreme Court had to de-
cide that contingent remainders could still be barred
by merger. After that, real property lawyers in Chicago
trembled for a decade. What other supposedly obsolete
common-law rules must they reckon with? No one knew.
In Nebraska in 1907, title to valuable lots in the business
center of the capital turned on whether there were possi-
bilities of reverter in that jurisdiction. It was not thought
safe to try and a compromise was made. Anomalous rules
and rules based on history only, which are out of touch with
the legal system as a whole, embarrass many important
fields of the law. Our analytical methods have been fast
identifying these anomalies. But we do not get rid of them.
Morover, irrationality of form continually breeds irrational-
ity of substance, as was seen above in connection with
fictions.
(e) Confusion. Courts are frequently led into mistakes
between the two parallel lines of case law and statute law,
dealing with the same subjects, the one potentially with the
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whole, the other unsystematically with parts here and there.
No court has authority and no legislature, as a rule, under-
takes to reduce any subject to systematic and complete
orderly statement.
(3) Passing to the third point which we have seen in
connection with the enactment of codes, we come to a matter
which is likely longest to retard effective codification in the
United States. Where significant codes have been enacted
the growing point of the legal system had shifted to legis-
lation and an efficient organ of legislation on matters of law
had developed. Undoubtedly with us the growing point has
largely shifted to legislation. But we have not developed
an efficient organ of lawmaking for the ordinary civil side
of the law. In England, if the government takes up a pro-
posal for legislation it has the machinery for pushing it
through Parliament. Also through the institution of parlia-
mentary counsel England has got rid of some of the causes
of crudity in legislation as to private law. But as has been
said, Parliament is not interested in "lawyer's law." In the
United States, both houses of Congress now have competent
legislative counsel and this is true in some states. This,
however, does not suffice to do more than insure the form
of statutes. It seldom involves grasp of the legal difficulties
at the root of a question. Moreover, there is nothing with
us comparable to the taking up of a measure of detailed law
reform by the cabinet in England and thus giving it the
right of way in a crowded session.
(4) On the other hand, the fourth point, the need of one
law, is of more importance with us today than any of the
others. It is suggestive that with the economic unification
of the country conflict of laws is becoming one of the
most important everyday subjects in the average American
practice. The demand for one law was behind the growth
of the common law. Prior to the Conquest there was no
one law of England. Local customary law differed greatly.
As one of the demands in Magna Carta was for one measure
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of corn and one measure of ale for all England, so another
demand of the time was for one measure of law. Such a
demand may some day lead to codification of the common
law in the United States.
Our condition is much worse than that of England in
respect of uncertainty, unwieldy bulk, and need of uni-
fication.
Attempt to reshape the law by judicial overruling of
leading cases is no substitute for well drawn, comprehensive
legislation. The English have an advantage in that down
to the nineteenth century, and indeed till the second half
of that century, relatively few cases were decided by the
House of Lords. Hence old cases decided by tribunals not
of ultimate authority may be questioned, whereas with us
the ultimate reviewing court is likely to have fixed a century
ago or more the law we should like to see changed or given
up. Patchwork overruling along with patchwork legislative
tinkering often does at least as much harm to the legal
system as it does good. Our situation calls for a ministry
of justice or a code; and a code will need a ministry of
justice also.
Roscoe Pound.
